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I. Introduction
Comparisons among different procedural systems have always
provided an unending source of deep analyses in the theoretical
literature of modem procedural law. These comparisons have also
generated far-reaching changes in many systems of law that have
endorsed elements imported in full or in part from other legal
systems. As is well-known, there is a central axis of comparison
between the adversary system practiced in common law legal
systems (England and the United States), among others, and the
inquisitory system practiced in the continental-civil legal systems.
There is, however, an additional axis of comparison which may be
of particular interest, perhaps even more so than the adversary-
inquisitory axis: the procedural system of Jewish law. This axis of
comparison between inquisitory and adversary procedural systems
and the procedural system practiced in Jewish law provides a
broad basis for original and exciting legal literature.' It presents a
confrontation not only between different systems of law, but also
between Western culture and Jewish culture. Some scholars are of
the opinion that Jewish law Provides a basis for the reform and
development of Western law. In the United States, Jewish law is
used-and often reinterpreted-to provide a requisite counter-
' See Yuval Sinai, The Court's Intervention in Litigation According to Jewish Law
(May 2003) [hereinafter Jewish Law] (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Bar-Ilan University, on
file with author). It is well known that numerous difficulties attach to the identification
of the pertinent sources in the literature of Jewish law and its accurate and efficient
analysis. Naturally, these difficulties are largely responsible for the paucity of
comparative research comparing Western procedural systems and Jewish law. Id.
2 See, e.g., PATRICK GLENN, THE LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 120-22 (2007)
(commenting on the various legal systems, among them Talmudic Law, across
geographic areas and cultures).
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model for contemporary U.S. legal theory. 3
This article deals largely with comparative research and may
serve as a paradigm for dealing with the subject of procedural
systems from the perspective of the conflict between common law
and the procedural model of Jewish law.
One of the central distinctions in evidence law, the source of
which is the common law, is the distinction between two burdens
of proof: the burden of persuasion and the burden of producing
evidence.4 The burden of persuasion, which is the principal
burden imposed on the litigant, requires him to prove the justice of
his claims.5 The secondary burden of producing evidence is the
duty required in order to discharge the burden of persuasion.
6
Both in criminal and civil cases, the results of a trial are frequently
determined in accordance with rules of the burden of persuasion.7
Scholars have referred to this as the risk of non-persuasion. 8
A central portion of this article concerns one of the central
burden-of-persuasion rules in Anglo-American law, the
affirmative defense doctrine. 9 The term affirmative defense is
3 See Suzanne L. Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish
Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 814
(1993).
4 See James B. Thayer, The Burden of Proof 4 HARV. L. REV. 45, 46-47 (1890)
[hereinafter Thayer]; JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW (1898) [hereinafter TREATISE] (this pioneering research was published
over 100 years ago).
5 See Thayer, supra note 4, at 46-47.
6 Its concern is with the sufficiency, or adequacy of evidence. This means that in
terms of the amount of evidence, submitted, and assuming its reliability, the judge is
permitted to make a finding. See TREATISE, supra note 4, 355-57.
7 A prolific literature has developed on the subject of the burden of persuasion:
See, e.g., CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 561-65 (2006); SYDNEY
L. PHIPSON, PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE 125-26 (2005); COLIN TAPPER & RUPERT CROSS,
CROSS & TAPPER ON EVIDENCE 108-09 (1999); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD
C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 114-15 (1999); NEIL ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 464-466 (1994); ADRIAN KEANE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 57-59
(1989); SYDNEY L. PHIPSON & D.W. ELLIOTT, MANUAL OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 54-61
(1987); JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, 287-92 (1981); see
generally Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof: The Economics of Legal Burdens, BYU
L. REV. 1 (1997) (an analysis from the perspective of the economic approach to law).
8 If, upon the termination of hearing evidence, it transpires that a particular claim
has not been proved to the level of persuading the court, the court will rule in accordance
with the burden of persuasion, i.e., it will rule against the litigant who bore the burden of
proving his claim. See, e.g., CROSS & TOPPER, supra note 7; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 7.
9 See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 584-93 (explaining that the traditional
common law principle of confession and avoidance is similar to the affirmative defense
doctrine).
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traditionally used to describe the allocation of a burden, either of
production, persuasion, or both, to the defendant in a criminal
case. 10 The burden is fixed by statute or case law at the beginning
of the case and does not depend upon the introduction of any
evidence by the prosecution. 1 Positive law commonly requires
criminal defendants to prove any affirmative defense, or-as in
England - "any exemption, exception, proviso, excuse or
qualification to a statutory offence by a preponderance of the
evidence."'
' 2
This article focuses primarily on the affirmative defense
doctrine in civil cases.' 3 Under this doctrine, the defendant needs
to prove any defense that qualifies as affirmative by a
preponderance of the evidence. 4 This category is very broad." It
extends to any claim of a defendant that does not simply deny the
facts underlying the claimant's cause of action.' 6  Affirmative
defenses include frustration, estoppel, res judicata, waiver and
forfeiture, pre-emption, statute of limitations, contributory fault,
comparative negligence, and many others. 
17
A defendant's responsive pleading must admit or deny each
averment upon which the plaintiff relies.' 8 However, there are
times when affirmation or denial is inadequate. For example, a
responding party may be willing to admit a factual allegation but
still contend that she had a justifiable reason for her action. At
common law, this was called pleading in "confession and
avoidance."' 19 It was a way of saying that even if the allegation
can be proven, there is an excuse that is recognized under the law.
It is different from a denial because it does not seek to deny an
element of the opposing party's case, but sets out affirmatively a
1o Id.
Ii Id.
12 See Magistrates' Courts Act, 1980, c. 43, § 101 (Eng.); PAUL ROBERTS & ADRIAN
ZUCKERMAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 373-84 (2004).
13 See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 563.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See id.; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 618 (2003) [POSNER].
18 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
19 See JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, COMMON LAW PLEADING 460-65
(1969); see also WILLIAM B. ODGERS, ODGERS ON CIVIL COURT ACTIONS 198-201
(1996); JAMES F. STEPHEN, A TREASTISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL
ACTIONS 229-46 (1895); THOMAS CHImTY, TREATISE ON PLEADING 551-58 (1844).
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new issue that goes beyond disproving that element.20
Affirmative defense is the modem equivalent of the common
law plea in confession and avoidance. 21 There are two bases for
defending against a civil law suit.22 First, the defendant may deny
that the plaintiffs claim has any merit. 23 Second, the defendant
may prove an affirmative defense.24 The first approach forces the
plaintiff to prove the claim by disputing the alleged facts and
challenging the plaintiffs evidence. The defendant's objective is
to prevent the plaintiffs claim from proving a cause of action.2
5
For example, the plaintiff claims, "You did it," and the defendant
responds, "No, I did not." The second approach to defending
against any civil action is to allege and prove an affirmative
defense that avoids or defeats a plaintiff's claim. 26 An affirmative
defense overcomes the claim without regard to whether the claim
is true and could be fully proven.27 An affirmative defense is one
that "avoids" rather than "denies" the truth of a plaintiffs
allegation. For example, the plaintiff says, "You did it," and the
defendant replies, "Maybe, I did it, but I win anyway, because you
or I did (or failed to do) something too." The "something too" is
the affirmative defense.
A defendant must plead an affirmative defense to use it in a
case.28 Each affirmative defense only applies to certain causes of
action. A defendant must prove each element of the defense, or it
fails.29 In other words, a defendant has the burden of proving an
affirmative defense, just as a plaintiff has the burden of proving a
cause of action. Most affirmative defense must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.
This article has four parts. Part II critically examines the
doctrine of affirmative defense and the rules governing the burden
20 See RICHARD L. MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 204 (2005).
21 Id.
22 See WILLIAM M. HART & RODERICK D. BLANCHARD, LITIGATION AND TRIAL
PRACTICE FOR THE LEGAL PARAPROFESSIONAL 126-41 (2007).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
29 See HART, supra note 22, at 126-41.
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of persuasion in the common law. The examination will be
conducted from the perspective of the central objectives of civil
procedure. 30 In modem law, increasing attention has recently been
devoted to what is referred to as "procedural justice." 31  Part II
will examine whether the burden of persuasion rules, among them
the doctrine of affirmative defense, indeed realize appropriate
procedural objectives and values.
In Part II, this piece addresses some of the difficulties with the
affirmative defense doctrine. Part II examines the doctrine from
the economic cost-efficiency perspective, where difficulties are
created due to the conduct of parties' whose litigation strategy is
governed by their fear being trapped into affirmative defense
situations. Clearly, this situation places an onerous burden on the
court to uncover the truth and, in doing so, significantly increases
the costs of the proceeding.
Part III presents a second procedural model based on Jewish
law, which is based on the fundamental rule of "he who takes from
his friend bears the burden of proof' (ha-mozi me-havero alav ha-
rahyah), as well as the rules of "migo ". Under the Jewish model,
the burden of persuasion is usually imposed on the litigant seeking
to take from his rival, typically the plaintiff. Quite often, though
legal policy considerations dictate the imposition of the burden of
persuasion on a particular party even if from a strictly legal
perspective, that party cannot be regarded as a person "taking"
from his friend. Part III will present a number of examples for
deviation from the basic rule that "he who takes from his friend
bears the burden of proof." The meaning of the migo plea is that
the defendant making a certain claim will be believed because, had
he wished to lie, he could have told a better lie that would have
been believed. In other words, because he could have made a
30 Naturally, this article does not discuss all of the values that civil procedure
attempts to attain and deals just with the values relevant to this subject. Extensive
discussion of such topics can be found in various legal texts. See, e.g., William B.
Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 1865
(2002); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 840 (1984); John Leubsdorf,
Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1984); Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
399 (1973) [hereinafter Economic Approach].
31 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 225
(2004); Keneth M. Ehrenberg, Procedural Justice and Information in Conflict-Resolving
Institutions, 67 ALB. L. REV. 167, 167 (2003); K.F. ROHL & S. MACHURA, PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE (1997); MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986) [hereinafter DAMASKA].
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stronger claim, and he waived the chance, he is believed regarding
the claim he actually made. The migo doctrine is entirely different
from the affirmative defense doctrine. In fact, the two doctrines
produce diametrically opposed results. This article will show that
the preference given to the party in possession-which is fortified
by the migo doctrine-is just, moral, and conducive to truthful
pleading. It is also economically efficient, as the migo doctrine
encourages litigants to make truthful factual statements. The migo
doctrine creates security and legal certainty and is also
commensurate with the U.S. Constitution's protection of property
rights. This article will bolster the argument of the Jewish law
model being cost-efficient by using a game-theory: costly
signaling. Part III will show how Jewish law, by use of legal
tools, aims to ensure the veracity of the litigants' claims and
facilitates credible costly signaling.
Part IV presents a concluding comparative analysis of the
common law and Jewish law models.
II. The Doctrine of Affirmative Defense in the Anglo-
American Law-Foundations and Difficulties
The doctrine of affirmative defense serves as a classic
paradigm for the rules governing the burden of persuasion in the
common law. The foundations of the affirmative defense doctrine
arefound in the old system of special pleading.32 Under common
law pleading requirements, the parties pleaded against each other
until they joined issue on a question of law or fact.33 Each time
one party pleaded, the other had an opportunity to demur, to deny
the truth of his opponent's allegations, or to introduce new matter
and thus to confess and avoid the claim. 34 In the earliest days of
common law, unlike our modem era, denial and confession and
avoidance were strict alternatives. 35  The common law's
nurturance of special pleas made contingent claims common.36
Parties could, and frequently did, confess and avoid the pleas of
32 Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the
WorkProduct Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 365 (1990).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 363-65.
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37their opponents. Thus, if a party pleaded the making of a
contract, his opponent could specially plead that he was
incompetent to contract because of age or some other reason. 38 If
a party pleaded that the defendant struck him, his opponent could
specially plead that he was acting in self-defense. A special plea
(confession and avoidance) by the defendant would open the door
to further special pleading by the plaintiff.39 Ultimately, special
pleading made lawsuits depend on narrow issues of fact or law, a
result that seems alien to modem Anglo-American civil procedure.
Nonetheless, the hierarchical imprint and doctrinal structure both
remain.
40
The common law principle of confession and avoidance 41 is a
good example of one of the consequences of the affirmative
defense doctrine. Ordinarily, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff -the party who initiates the action or proceeding.
42
There is, however, no strict rule that the burden is on the party
who brings suit.43  When the defendant admits the plaintiffs
alleged cause of action, he absolves the plaintiff from the necessity
of making any proof in support of his claim. Instead, the
defendant then takes the role of actor in the suit and must satisfy
the court of the grounds forany counterclaim initiated by him.
44
According to the confession and avoidance principle, any litigant
making an important claim in a trial bears the burden of
persuasion in proving his claim. In usual debt claims, for instance,
a defendant claiming that he has paid the debt bears the burden of
persuasion in proving his claim.
4 5
This principal burden is permanent and is not transferred to the
plaintiff at any stage in the trial. The payment claim is usually a
claim of confession and avoidance. Effectively, the defendant
admits all of the facts claimed by the plaintiff, which form the
grounds of his action.46 However, he "avoids" the action by
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 KOFFLER ET AL., supra note 19, at 460-65.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id
44 TREATISE, supra note 4, at 369.
45 KOFFLER ET AL., supra note 19, at 460-65.
46 Id.
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adding facts that indicate that the debt has expired.47 This claim
exempts the plaintiff from the need to furnish any kind of proof.
The concept of confession and avoidance is not limited to the
payment claim and includes any claim having the same import.
4 8
The nature of the risk involved in the confession and avoidance
situation is noteworthy-the risk of non-persuasion. The
defendant's admission of the debt is effectively an admission of
the grounds of the claim and he therefore runs the risk of being
trapped by his admission, because he must prove payment. Should
he fail to prove payment and fail to avoid the claim, the plaintiff
receives a judgment in his favor based on the defendant's
admission, without having to prove his claim.
49
The next section of the article will examine whether the burden
of persuasion rules, among them the doctrine of affirmative
defense, indeed realize appropriate procedural objectives and
values.
A. The Question of the Justification for Burden-of-
Persuasion Rules
One of the most important procedural values of a legal system
is the assurance of a rational legal proceeding. One cannot
imagine a judge resolving a case, for example, by tossing a coin,
even though it is a neutral, objective, and efficient method of
decision making. 50 Decision making procedures affect the basic
rights of litigants, and decisions of this kind should not be
irrational or arbitrary. This brings us to the issue of a rational,
value based, and moral justification for a particular procedural
arrangement. As noted above, any doctrine prescribing a burden
for producing evidence or burden of persuasion must have a valid
justification, because the decision to impose the burden of
persuasion on a particular party decisively affects his chances in
the trial itself. The reason is that after all the evidence has been
submitted, if the court deems that a particular claim has not been
proven to its satisfaction, it will rule in accordance with the burden
of persuasion. For comparative purposes, the justification of the
ancient rule in Jewish Law, "he who takes from his friend bears
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See Resnik, supra note 3030, at 852-53.
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the burden of proof," (meaning that a legal "extraction" or "taking
from" another person must be justified by evidence) is clear and
simple. 5' The next section of this article will show that nothing is
more justified than imposing the burden of proof on the person
attempting to appropriate a possession of his friend.
What then is the justification for the burden of persuasion rules
of the common law? This article will use the doctrine of
affirmative defense as a test case. Why should the defendant who
needs to prove an affirmative defense be disadvantaged at trial?
Why does he, and not his friend who wants to take money from
him, run the risk of non-persuasion? How can a plaintiff win his
trial without having adduced evidence that justifies his claim? The
answer to these questions is far from simple and the classic
responses do not provide adequate justification.
The burden of persuasion rules are rooted in the English
Common law. 2 For example, under English case law, when the
defendant confirms that the plaintiff paid him a sum of money,
absent any familial connection between them, it will be legally
presumed that the plaintiff is entitled to demand payment of the
debt.5 3  This is normally the case unless the particular
circumstances negate the duty of return, i.e. the existence of
previous debts of the plaintiff to the defendant, or payment having
been made for consideration, all of which must be proved by the
defendant. 54 In light of this fact, this article will briefly review the
foundations of the burden-of-persuasion rules in the common law.
B. Burden of Persuasion Rules and Rationales in the
Common Law-Major Difficulties
1. The Affirmative/Negative Claim Doctrine
The central doctrine in English common law is that the burden
of persuasion in civil law is imposed on the party making an
affirmative claim and not on the one denying a certain claim, or
state of affairs (Ei qui affirmat non ei qui negat incumbit
51 See RABBI SHLOMO YOSEF ZEVIN, ENCYCLOPAEDIA TALMUDIT (TALMUDIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA), Vol. 9, 455 (1993).
52 See Thayer, supra note 4, at 46-47.
53 See PHIPSON, supra note 7, at 128.
54 Seldon v. Davidson, [1968] 2 All ER 755 (appeal taken from U.K.).
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probation).55 This point was stressed by Lord Maugham in Joseph
Constantine Steamship Line, Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corp.,
Ltd.56  "It is an ancient rule founded on consideration of good
sense and should not be departed from without strong reasons."
57
United States court rulings have reflected the same
considerations. 58 Statements are found primarily in older cases to
the effect that even though a party is required to plead a fact, it is
not required to prove that fact if its averment is negative rather
than affirmative in form.
59
In legal literature the doctrine of the affirmative claim test is
supported inter alia by the commonplace understanding that
negative facts are more difficult to prove than positive facts. For
example, it is easier to prove the affirmative claim that a person
paid his debt, or that his car hit a pedestrian, or that he possesses a
license for working in a profession, than to prove the negative fact
such as failure to pay a debt, lack of consent where consent is
required, or unlicensed dealing in a profession. Similarly, it is
easier to find a witness who will positively confirm that he had
seen a particular item in a room than to find a witness who will
confirm the opposite-a negative fact-that the object was not in
the room.
However, this doctrine has been widely criticized. The
assumption that it is easier to prove an affirmative fact than a
negative one is also questionable. 61 For example, the difficulty in
proving that a debt was not paid as opposed to proof of payment is
not the specific result of the affirmative or negative nature of the
claims, but rather of the fact that non-payment of a debt extends
over a larger period of time, making it difficult to prove that a
person did not pay his debt on any particular day at all. The "I
55 Joseph Constantine Steamship Line, Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corp., Ltd.,
[1942] AC 154, 174 (H.L.) (appeal taken from A.C.).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See, e.g., Levine v. Pascal, 236 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); People v.
Yost, 382 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Thomas v. Allegheny & Eastern Coal
Co., 455 A.2d 637, 638-39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., 678 P.2d
298, 304 (Utah 1984).
59 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 564.
60 See PHIPSON, supra note 7, at 127.
61 See generally Kevin W. Saunders, The Mythic Difficulty in Proving a Negative,
15 SETON HALL L. REv. 276 (1985) (disputing that there are innate difficulties in
"proving negative averments").
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have paid" claim on the other hand is easier to prove because it
relates to the specific point in time at which the debt was paid.
Saunders suggests the same distinction with reference to the
quantitative difference between a claim comprising numerous
factual propositions (such as that a particular event never occurred
at any point in time) and a claim consisting of an affirmative
factual proposition (for example that the particular event occurred
at a particular point in time).62 Another way of expressing this
viewpoint is by distinguishing between a universal fact, some kind
of comprehensive truth that is difficult to prove, and an existential
fact, pertaining to a localized event, that is easier to prove.63
Furthermore, even if the assumption is accepted that it is easier
to prove an affirmative fact than a negative one, it remains unclear
why this should justify imposing the risk of failing to discharge
the burden of persuasion on the party making the affirmative
claim. A litigant making an affirmative claim has committed no
crime that justifies his placement in a procedurally inferior
position to that of his rival who makes a negative claim.
Moreover, it has been correctly claimed that this doctrine
places undue emphasis on a formalistic test that is ultimately
dependent upon the pleading and the particular wording of the
forms and claim sheets (affirmative or negative).65 It has been
suggested that this doctrine is erroneously interpreted to mean that
even though a party is required to plead a fact, proof is not
required if the averment is negative rather than affirmative in
form.6 6 The primary point behind this criticism is that language is
too easily manipulated.67 As such, it offers a definite escape route
to the litigant fearful of not discharging the burden of persuasion
by enabling him to camouflage his affirmative claim in a contrived
and convoluted wording that presents it in the negative form.68
62 Id.
63 See id. at 677-78.
64 This question could possibly be answered with claims of efficiency. See infra
Part I.B.4.
65 See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 564, 590-91; CROSS & TAPPER, supra note 7,
at 118-19; Lee, supra note 7, at 1.
66 See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 564, 590-91; CROSS & TAPPER, supra note 7,
at 118-19; Lee, supra note 7, at 1.
67 See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIvIL PROCEDURE § 7.8, at
322 (3d ed. 1985); Charles V. Laughlin, The Location of the Burden of Persuasion, 18
Pmr. L. REv. 3, 5-6 (1956).
68 A similar phenomenon exists regarding the escape routes from the burden of
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In addition, the burden of persuasion is often imposed on the
litigant making a negative claim.69  Saunders explained that this
occurs in cases in which both claims comprise the same number of
foundational facts.70  For example, where the dispute is over the
sanity (or insanity) of a particular person, the negative claim is no
harder to prove than its affirmative counterpart, and other rules are
required for determining which party bears the burden of
persuasion. 7 1 In this context it has even been claimed that modem
technological methods occasionally make the proof of the negative
facts easier than it was in the past.
American case law also echoes the approach whereby facts of
a negative nature do not transfer the burden of persuasion but will
nonetheless affect the burden of producing evidence.73 The person
bearing the burden of persuasion must be the party that opens with
the presentation of prima facie evidence. 74 However, in so far as
the fact is a negative one, and hence difficult to prove, the court
imposes a lower threshold of what constitutes prima facie
evidence that discharges the burden of producing evidence,
shifting the burden to the rival party to present refuting evidence.75
Further difficulties of the negative-affirmative test will be
discussed in the next chapter, which deals with the major
drawbacks of the affirmative defense doctrine.
proof in criminal law. See, e.g., Alex Stein, After Hunt: The Burden of Proof Risk of
Non-Persuasion and Judicial Pragmatism, 54 MOD. L. REv. 570, 572 (1991)
[hererinafter After Hunt]; contra PHIPSON, supra note 7, at 127 (On the other hand,
Phipson claims that this test is used for assessing the substance or content of a claim as
positive or negative, and not in a technical manner dictated by the syntactical
formulation resorted to by the litigant).
69 See, e.g., CROSS & TAPPER, supra note 7, at 118-19; WIGMORE, supra note 7, at
288; Robert E. Scott & George S. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,
115 YALE L.J. 814, 864 (2006) (acknowledging an acceptance that the burden of
persuasion is imposed on the party claiming that a contract was not fulfilled). American
law also recognizes the presumption whereby a check or promissory note is given
against consideration, and the burden for claiming the opposite lies on the party who
contests the enforcement of the bill. See, e.g., Kreutz v. Wolff, 560 S.W.2d 271, 276
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Northlake Cmty. Hosp. v. Cadkin, 370 N.E.2d 1094, 1097-98 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977).
70 See Saunders, supra note 61, at 286-87.
71 Id.
72 See CROSS & TAPPER , supra note7, at 118-19 (referring to the judgment where
the "negative" fact that the defendant had not filed his tax returns was sufficiently proven
by the computer printouts of the taxation authorities).
73 See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 564.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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2. The Accessibility to the Evidence Doctrine
Under the accessibility to the evidence doctrine, referred to
quite frequently in Anglo-American case law and legal literature,
where the evidence pertaining to litigation is naturally within the
knowledge or possession of a particular party, the burden of
persuasion is imposed on the party with greater accessibility to the
evidence 76 (even if he is claiming a fact of a negative nature77).
For example, the defendant must prove payment of his debts
because his accessibility to the relevant evidence is greater than
that of his rival, given his ability to submit a receipt, etc.78 This
doctrine differs from the previous doctrine even though in many,
but not all, cases it produces similar results. 79 The reason is that,
generally, the litigants making affirmative claims have greater
accessibility to evidence than litigants making a negative claim.8 0
Imposing the burden of persuasion on the party with the greatest
accessibility to evidence has also been supported for reasons of
economic efficiency. On this basis, a test was established that
imposes the burden of persuasion on the party capable of creating
effective evidence at the cheapest price. This point was already
made by Jeremy Bentham, 82 the head of the utilitarian school in
jurisprudence, who wrote that the burden of proof should be
76 See Metropolitan Dade County v. Hemandez, 708 So. 2d 1008, 1009 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998); Allstate Finance Corp. v. Zimmerman, 330 F.2d 740, 744 (5th Cir.
1964); MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 564; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at
117-18. (It is noteworthy that in some of the judgments, such as in Zimmerman, the
courts rely not only on the special knowledge of one of the parties, but also on the fact
that from his perspective the fact is a positive one, whereas for his rival, the fact is a
negative one. However, the court did not make any distinction between these two
reasons).
77 See, e.g., United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1989)(holding that a person seeking to prevent the forfeiture of his property must prove his
status as an "innocent owner," i.e. that he had no knowledge of the illegal use made of
the asset, or that he did not consent to its use in that manner, because these are with
which he is particularly familiar); Pace v. Hymas, 726 P.2d 693 (Idaho 1986) (showing
that the defendant was required to prove that the plaintiffs dismissal was the result of
economic constraints. There was no other way of confronting the economic difficulty,
other than by way of cutting down on manpower. These are facts, similar to the decisions
that lead to the dismissal decision, that are known to the defendant).
78 See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 564.
79 See id.
80 Id.
81 Jody S. Kraus, Decoupling Sales Law from the Acceptance-Rejection Fulcrum,
104 YALE L.J. 129, 135-52 (1994).
82 Jeremy Bentham, An Introductory View of Rationale of Evidence; For the Use of
Non-lawyers as well as Lawyers, in THE WoRKs OF JEREMY BENTHAM 139 (1962)
[hereinafter Bentham].
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imposed on the party best positioned to bear it, "on whom it will
sit the lightest.",83 However, Bentham also expressed a different
position in one of his other studies, which is discussed later in the
article.8 4 Moreover, Professor Alex Stein has shown that in terms
of economic theory, it is preferable to impose the burden of
persuasion on the plaintiff even if he has less accessibility to
evidence than the defendant.8 5 The following chapter will show
that one of the central problems of the affirmative defense doctrine
is that it encourages litigant dishonesty. As with the burden of
persuasion, a similar problem exists with respect to the rationale of
accessibility to the evidence. Stein points out the shortcomings of
the evidence accessibility test from the perspective of economic
efficiency, insofar as it fails to provide positive incentives to the
honest litigant and to those who fear disclosing facts that are
prejudicial to them. 6
In other words, the accessibility to evidence test is not friendly
to the honest litigant, and the dishonest litigants may profit as a
result. The real problem, however, is much deeper. The central
critique of the utilitarian and economic approach is that it
generally takes a monolithic view of benefit at the expense of
other important questions such as substantive justice and
fairness.8 In fact, in the current context, the question arises as to
whether there is any justification for shifting the burden of
persuasion to the party with greater accessibility to evidence.
Why should he bear the risk of failing to discharge the burden of
persuasion? Stein rightly notes that in the context of the
accessibility to evidence test, a distinction must be made between
the burden of persuasion and the burden of producing evidence.
8 8
83 Id.
84 See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
85 Alex Stein, Allocating the Burden of Proof in Sales Litigation: The Law, Its
Rationale, a New Theory, and Its Failure, 50 U. MIAMI L.REv. 335, 335 (1996)
[hereinafter Sales Litigation].
86 Id. at 337-38.
87 Obviously, this presentation of matters is a generalization, for there are
significant differences between the extreme version of the utilitarianism of Jeremy
Bentham, and the more complex doctrine of J.S. Mill and other supporters of
utilitarianism. This view is presented and critiqued in JAMES W. HARRIS, LEGAL
PHILOSOPHIES 40-50 (2nd ed., 1977). On fairness vs. efficiency see ALEX STEIN,
FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 214-44 (2005) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE
LAW].
88 Sales Litigation, supra note 85, at 336. Stein made similar comments regarding
the rationale of imposing the burden of persuasion on the party capable of creating the
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Increased accessibility to evidence may justify imposing the
burden of proof, but certainly cannot justify shifting the burden of
persuasion.
The mere fact that one party to a proceeding holds relevant
information or has peculiarly good access to some important
evidence cannot be a valid reason for shifting the persuasion
burden to him. Once his evidence is produced for examination at
the trial, his advantage evaporates. Bentham's idea of placing the
burden of proof "on whom it will sit lightest" should accordingly
only apply to the production burden.
Allocation of the risk of non-persuasion should be grounded in
other reasons, such as substantive legal preferences. 89
McCormick also stresses the danger of overemphasizing the
importance of accessibility and awareness of proof, since the
burden of proof will frequently be imposed on one party despite
the other party's advantage in terms of accessibility to evidence. 90
For example, in torts and breach of contract claims, the plaintiff9'
generally bears the burden of proving the elements of the
defendant's actions despite the defendant's obvious advantage in
terms of his knowledge of the acts involved and his accessibility to
the relevant evidence. 92 Occasionally, however, the situation is
reversed. 93 For example, a defendant in a tort claim is required to
prove the plaintiffs contributory negligence, despite the fact that
the plaintiff himself is certainly aware of its existence.94
Accordingly, Wigmore contends that the aforementioned doctrine
cannot be an exclusive test and must be combined with other
considerations.
95
3. Other Doctrines
Another popular doctrine states that a litigant asserting an
most effective testimony at the cheapest price. In one of his earlier articles, Stein makes
a similar claim while discussing the burden of persuasion in criminal law. After Hunt,
supra note 68, at 572.
89 Id.
90 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 564.
9' The plaintiff in torts must prove all of the elements forming the basis of his suit.
92 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 564.
93 Id.; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 118.
94 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 564.; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at
118.
95 See WIGMORE, supra note 7, at 291.
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essential claim in his case bears the burden of persuasion in
proving that claim. 96  This doctrine has been criticized even
though substantively it contributes nothing. 97  In essence, the
doctrine is just a different formulation of the question of who
bears the burden of proof.98 The inescapable question will still be:
for which party is the claim or evidence essential? The answer to
the second question is no easier than the answer to the first,
99
especially when a particular subject is equally critical to both
parties. 100 In addition, the justification is unclear for the risk of
non-persuasion being imposed specifically on the party raising a
claim that is essential to his position.
When deciding which party bears the burden of proof, courts
will often distinguish between proving the elements required to
establish the grounds of a claim, which normally rests on the
shoulders of the applicant, and proving the applicability of
exceptions and qualifications to the rule, which will be imposed on
the opposing party.10' This test is positivist and formalistic, as it
fails to address the value-based justification of the legal norm,
sufficing with an examination of its status and meaning.
1°2
Moreover, McCormick notes that the use of this test occasionally
produces an arbitrary allocation of the burdens, since it is based on
the chance wording of the law; as the statutory language may be
due to a mere casual choice of form by the draftsman.'
0 3
96 See First Nat'l Bank of Louisville v. Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. I, 763 F.2d
188, 190 (6th Cir. 1985); Vance v. My Apartment Steak House, Inc. 677 S.W.2d 480,
482 (Tex. 1984).
97 McCoRMICK, supra note 7, at 564; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at
116 n.9; Lee, supra note 7, at 1; see also Thayer, supra note 4, at 59-63; WIGMORE,
supra note 7, at 288.
98 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 564; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at
116 n.9; Lee, supra note 7, at 1; see also Thayer, supra note 4, at 59-63; WIGMoRE,
supra note 7, at 288.
99 MCCoRMICK, supra note 7, at 564; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at
116 n.9; Lee, supra note 7, at 1; see also Thayer, supra note 4, at 59-63; WIGMORE,
supra note 7, at 288.
100 See ALAN TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 24 (2d ed. 2000).
10, See, e.g. Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co. 445 F.3d 311, 321-22 (4th Cir.
2006); Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp. 224 F.3d 226, 229 (3rd Cir. 2000); Kocsis v.
Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc. 97 F.3d 876, 883 (6th Cir. 1996); MCCoRMICK, supra note 7, at
564-565; CROSS & TAPPER, supra note 7, at 118-19.
102 According to one of the central claims of legal positivism, which was harshly
criticized among the non-positivists, there is no necessary connection between law and
morality, and the treatment of legal questions requires a distinction between the question
of norms as legal norms and the question of the value-laden contents of legal norms. See
H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 49 (1983).
103 MCCoRMICK, supra note 7, at 565; see also After Hunt, supra note 68
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Another important consideration in the determination of the
burden of proof concerns the reasonability and probability of the
factual claim. 10 4  According to one doctrine, the burden of
persuasion should rest with the party claiming the occurrence of an
unusual event. 10 5  According to this principle, courts make a
judicial estimate of the probabilities of an outcome and
accordingly assign the burden of proof on the party alleging the
least-likely scenario. 1°6  For example, two parties in a business
relationship would not reasonably provide service to each other
free of charge. As such, a party claiming that he received a gift
would bear the burden of proving it, whereas the gift claim would
certainly be reasonable in the context of intra-family relations, and
the burden of persuasion would therefore rest on the party
claiming that he is owed payment.
107
This doctrine is certainly preferable to its predecessors, even if
it is not always followed. It would appear there is no problem in
justifying the reasonability test. Intuitively speaking, and in terms
of life experience, certain events are by their very nature rare and
unlikely. Consequently, when the scales are even, it is only fair to
decide the case in accordance with the initial assumption, and to
place the risk of non-persuasion on the party claiming that such an
exceptional event occurred. In fact, many presumptions are based
on reasonableness and life experience, and it is commonplace that
they are highly influential with respect to the burden of proof.108
A test related to reasonability is also likely to be accepted by
supporters of the economic approach to law.
109
Certain scholars, however, have criticized the imposition of the
burden of persuasion in accordance with the reasonability and
(discussing extensively the various problems with this doctrine in the context of criminal
law).
104 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 565.
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic
Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 12-13 (1959).
107 Gibson v. McCraw, 332 S.E.2d 145, 152 (W.Va 1985); MCCORMICK, supra note
7, at 475-76. English law also recognizes the presumption that funds, assets, or services
are given free of consideration within the family and for consideration outside the
family. See Tribe v. Tribe, [1995] 4 All E.R. 236 (appeal taken from U.K.); Seldon v.
Davidson, [1968] 2 All E.R. 755 (appeal taken from U.K.).
1o For the different kinds of presumptions and their effect on evidentiary burdens,
see MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 572-83; CROSS & TAPPER, supra note 7, at 122-24;
PHIPSON, supra note 7, at 135-36; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 125-26.
109 See MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 148 n.56.
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probability test.110 They claim that the determination of which
claim is more reasonable is itself dependent on the court's
determination after having been persuaded by the parties'
pleadings."' Another practical criticism of the reasonability test is
that it is often impossible to make an advance determination of
which claim is more reasonable prior to hearing the evidence. 12
4. The Absence of a Single Rule Applicable to All Cases
The confusion prevailing in the common law over the question
of who should bear the burden of proof finds expression in the
following concluding comments of McCormick, lliwho candidly
admits:
In summary, there is no key principle governing the
apportionment of the burdens of proof. Their
allocation, either initially or ultimately, will depend
upon the weight that is given to any of several
factors, including: (1) the natural tendency to place
the burdens on the party desiring change, (2)
special policy considerations such as those
disfavoring certain defenses, (3) convenience, (4)
fairness, and (5) the judicial estimate of the
probabilities. 1
14
It is interesting to note Wigmore's characteristic and
unequivocal position, adopted after surveying the various rules of
the burden of proof. 115 "The truth is that there is not and cannot be
any one general solvent for all cases. It is merely a question of
policy and fairness based on experience in the different
110 See TREATISE, supra note 4, at 59-63; Stein, supra note 85, at 338-39.
'it See TREATISE, supra note 4, at 59-63; Stein, supra note 85, at 338-39. In this
context, one should remember the important warning of Professor Ball against the
frequently committed mistake of the double consideration of the reasonability factor
which may lead to distortions in the determination of the burden of persuasion. See V.C.
Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. R.
807, 817-18 (1961).
112 Sales Litigation, supra note 85, at 338-39.
113 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 565. In what follows, no distinction is made
between the burden of persuasion and the burden of adducing evidence, because in the
author's opinion, in most cases both of these onuses should be imposed on the shoulders
of the same party. Compare HAZARD, supra note 67, at 322 99("There is no satisfactory
test for allocating the burden of proof in either sense on any given issue. The allocation
is made on the basis of one or more of several variable factors.").
114 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 565.
115 WIGMORE, supra note 7, at 291.
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situations."' 1 6  In the absence of a single, overarching rule
applicable to all cases, Wigmore claims that the determination of
who carries the burden of proof is frequently a difficult
decision.11 7 In a slander suit, for example, keeping in mind some
of the rules mentioned above (like the accessibility to evidence),
the burden of persuasion should rest with the plaintiff who bears
the burden of proving that the defendant's comments were
fundamentally false."18 On the other hand, it is both more fair and
just to require the defendant to prove that he spoke the truth.' 19 In
a tort action too, the accepted rules of burden of persuasion do not
answer the question of whether to saddle the plaintiff with proving
negligence or the defendant with proving the absence of
negligence. 12  Summing up his discussion of the rules governing
the burden of persuasion, Wigmore states unequivocally:
There is, then, no one principle, or set of
harmonious principles, which afford a sure and
universal test for the solution of a given class of
cases. The logic of the situation does not demand
such a test; it would be useless to attempt to
discover or to invent one; and the state of the law
does not justify us in saying that it is accepted any.
There are merely specific rules for specific classes
of cases, resting for their ultimate basis upon broad
reasons of experience and fairness.
121
This article has briefly addressed some of the central
difficulties and deficiencies of determining who bears the burden
of persuasion, chief among them being the lack of a satisfactory
justification for the burden of persuasion rules in the common law.
Naturally, these difficulties also characterize the doctrine of
affirmative defense that places the burden of persuasion on the
defendant 122 without sufficient justification. The following
116 Id. at 292.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Wigmore, supra note 7, at 292.
122 As discussed above, most of the tests for determining the burden of persuasion
do not provide sufficient justification. And, as stated, the reasonability test is justified
but is not relevant to cases of confession and avoidance because there is no reason to
assume that the "I paid" claim is an unreasonable claim that justifies shifting the burden
of persuasion to the defendant's shoulders.
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chapter deals with additional difficulties with this doctrine.
C. The Doctrine of Affirmative Defense-Additional
Difficulties and Drawbacks
This section addresses some of the additional difficulties with
the affirmative defense doctrine (and the common law principle of
confession and avoidance) and goes beyond the major justificatory
difficulties discussed in the previous chapters. Section D will
address the difficulties with the affirmative defense doctrine from
the economic cost-efficiency perspective.
1. The Influence on the Conduct of Litigation
Proceedings Between the Parties
The central problem with the affirmative defense doctrine
concerns the doctrine's influence on the litigation proceedings
between the parties. Here, I will diverge from the discussion of
fundamental and rational considerations for the burden of
persuasion dealt with in the previous section, and instead, deal
with more realistic issues. This section focuses on the connection
between the rules of persuasion and their effect on our friend the
"bad man,"'1 23 who tempts honest people to adopt evil ways and
was underscored by the eminent American, Justicen Oliver
Holmes. As mentioned in the beginning of this article, the risk
that accompanies the shifting of the burden of persuasion in
affirmative defense and in the confession and avoidance situation
may be far-reaching, to the extent of losing the trial. Accordingly,
this risk confronts every litigant, and it need not surprise us that
many defendants suddenly seek desperate escape routes from the
"trap" of confession and avoidance. This point is addressed by
Jacob: 12
4
A plea of confession and avoidance may be, and
often is, raised as an alternative to a traverse of the
allegations made in the statement of claim, and this
is the safe course, as the defendant gets the best of
both worlds, since he denies those allegations, but
alternatively confesses and avoids them.'
2 5
123 Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-61 (1897);
OLIVER W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 172-73 (1920).
124 JACK H. JACOB, PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGS 88-89 (12th ed. 1975).
125 Id.
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English attorneys are similarly guided with respect to the
wording of statements of defense in Odgers' famous book Odgers
on Pleading.- 126
All matter in confession and avoidance must be
pleaded specially. The pleader must not attempt to
insinuate it under an apparent traverse; he should
state clearly and distinctly and in a separate
paragraph. At the same time, he should not confess
and avoid where a mere traverse is sufficient. For
he will thus introduce collateral matter which his
client may have to prove, instead of putting the
plaintiff to prove his allegations. 1
27
Odgers later presents the optimal-tactical claim which
preserves the majority of the procedural advantages: 128
In confessing and avoiding, as in traversing, the
plea must be neither too wide nor too narrow...
Be careful not to make too wide an averment,
whereby you will take on your shoulders an
unnecessary burden or too narrow an averment
which will fetter your hands at the trial. 1
29
This way of escaping from the "trap" of confession and
avoidance or affirmative defense is relevant to the modem U.S.
litigant. There is an assumption that a modem litigant has two
primary strategies for defeating an adverse claim. 130 He can deny
the claim in its own terms or defeat it with an affirmative defense
or similar contingent claim. 13 1  However, this assumption is
problematic, as pointed out by Allen et al.:
A potential client, ignorant of the law, has one
option-not two. He must deny the claim against
him in its own terms. Of course, if potential clients
were always honest, they would never deceitfully
deny claims. We assume that individuals will
sometimes be dishonest, in pursuit of their self-
126 GILES H. HARWOOD, ODGERS ON PLEADING AND PRACTICE 144 (20th ed. 1971).
127 Id. at 171.
128 Id. at 146-47.
129 Id. at 166-67.
130 Allen et al., supra note 32, at 365.
131 Id.
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interest. 32
Pleadings set out according to these tips will not always reflect
factual truth, instead creating a tactical, calculated game, played
with "hidden cards," in which each litigant presents the version
most convenient to him procedurally and tactically. Not
surprisingly, the tactical tips mentioned above and adopted by the
defendant to extricate himself from the trap of confession and
avoidance are widely accepted in England, which has an
adversarial system. 133 Failure to speak the truth in pleadings, as
discussed below, is an integral part of the traditional adversary
system.
In theoretical legal literature, an adversarial trial judge's role is
generally compared to that of a referee in a game in which he
plays no active part, 134 his role being restricted to ensuring the
parties' compliance with the rules of the game. 135 The adversarial
conception has even been compared to a competitive conception
wherein a party breaching the game rules incurs a technical loss,
and in which the winner is determined by comparison of the
parties' respective competitive levels at the end of the game. 136 It
has been claimed that the adversary system is based on the
conception that each of the parties is best positioned to know just
how to manage its own affairs and as such should have a
monopoly on the conducting of its own litigation.137  This
conception expresses the value of preserving individual freedom in
a democratic society, because the litigants express their freedom in
the conduct of their legal affairs.' 38 The judge also expresses these
values through self-restraint and eschewal of interference in the
132 Id.
133 Lord Denning, Jones v. Nat'l Coal Bd., [1957] 2 Q.B. 55. "In the system of trial
which we have evolved in this country, the judge sits to hear and determine the issues
raised by the parties, not to conduct an investigation or examination on behalf of society
in large." Id. at 63.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PENN. L. REv. 506, 581 (1973)
[hereinafter A Comparative Study]. The subject was clarified and elaborated on in a later
study devoted to the theoretical conflict between the two procedural systems. See
generally DAMASKA, supra note 31.
137 See Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal
Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 535 (1974) [hereinafter Structures ofAuthority].
138 Id.
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parties' handling of the proceedings.' 39
The doctrine of affirmative defense encourages litigant
prevarication as a means of transferring the burden of persuasion
to the other side; this conception is deeply rooted in the adversary
system. In fact, in the classic English adversarial system, the
accepted conception was that the defendant is under no obligation
to elaborate on his claims. 40 In the past, defendants in the King's
Bench court were permitted to enter a plea of general denial and
thereby compel the plaintiff to prove all of his claims, with no
exceptions;' a false denial was considered a legitimate tactic on
the defendant's part, especially if it afforded him a tactical
advantage over the plaintiff. In the common law, allegations and
denials in the answer do not have to be consistent with one another
("pleading in the alternative"). 142 For example, an answer may
deny that the plaintiff and defendant entered into the contract. At
the same time, the answer may allege that the plaintiffs claim on
the contract is barred by affirmative defense such as accord and
satisfaction, release, fraud, and waiver, which apply only if the
contract had been made. 143 In trial practice, whenever possible, a
defendant's two-pronged defense strategy should be to attack the
merits of the plaintiffs claim while at the same time attempting to
establish whatever affirmative defenses are available. 44 There is
no doubt that our friend the "bad man" rubs his hands in glee in
confronting this procedural system.
The doctrine of confession and avoidance, or affirmative
defense, thus provides a disincentive to the honest person
interested in giving a full and complete story but who is dissuaded
from doing so due to his fear of being "punished" by having the
burden of persuasion transferred to him. It provides a positive
incentive for our friend the "bad man," who does his best to create
139 Id.
140 This has changed in the contemporary U.S. legal system. See FED. R. Civ. P.
8(b).
'4' See Alfred T. Denning & Arthur Grattan-Bellow, BULLEN & LEAKE'S
PRECEDENTS OF PLEADING 543 (9th ed. 1935).
142 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Nevertheless, if the obligations of representations to the
court have been violated, then the court may impose an appropriate sanction upon the
attorneys, law firms, or parties for the violation, although in practice this is not widely
used. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b).
143 See FED. R. CIv. P. app. forms 20 and 21 (providing examples of answers and
their responses to allegations).
144 See Hart, supra note 22, at 138.
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difficulties for the other party. The result is that the doctrine of
affirmative defense, especially in situations of "confession and
avoidance," actually incites the litigant to mendacity, in the
knowledge that even if he is found to be a sinner his acts will also
profit him. It also encourages the parties to abuse their right of
access to legal authorities, thereby impairing the rights of access
of the other side.
2. Uncertainty
An additional difficulty of the doctrine of affirmative defense,
or confession and avoidance, has to do with uncertainty. The
previous section dealt with the confusion prevailing with respect
to the burden of persuasion rules and the various tests and
considerations operating in that context. Indeed the question of
who should bear the burden of persuasion is by no means simple
and both litigants and the courts confront difficulties that are not
always solved by way of the aforementioned tests and
considerations. Furthermore, there appear to be real difficulties in
the application of these tests and considerations, and they often
lead to different and anomalous, if not unacceptable, conclusions.
Quite frequently, it is difficult to determine who bears the burden
of persuasion and whether or not the situation is one of confession
and avoidance or of affirmative defense. Determining the latter is
dependent upon resolving a second question, which is in effect the
major question: What is included in the elements of the grounds of
action or offense? The second question is no more pliable than the
first and is occasionally given to different interpretations between
which it is difficult to decide from a substantive-formal
perspective. Occasionally the interpretations are expressions of
legal policy intended to prevent the escape from a position of
confession and avoidance and the desire to retain the validity of
the evidential rule.
Some scholars mention the problem of the creation of
affirmative defense doctrine in criminal cases.
145 The Patterson146
case tied the question of the constitutionality of affirmative
defenses directly to the formalistic notion that a true affirmative
defense is one that does not simply go to negate an element of an
145 McCORMICK, supra note 7, at 590-91.
146 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
2008
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
offense. 147  The question remains as to when something is an
element of an offense. Many cases have looked only to the
language of the statute, although some have considered how the
statute has been interpreted by the state courts.148 Moreover, as
emphasized by these scholars, no court has used an alternative
approach suggested in law journals to limit the use of affirmative
defenses. 149  Instead, the courts have relied upon the safer,
formalistic notions of Patterson.'5 ° The same formalistic view
applies in civil cases.
15 1
Notably, the phenomenon of allocating a portion of the burden
of persuasion on a formalistic test, which examines the
components of the ground of action, does not just characterize
situations of confession and avoidance and affirmative defense. It
also operates in other contexts related to the determination of the
burden of persuasion in the civil law.' 52 As noted, the courts do
not impose the burden of persuasion on the basis of a coherent,
standardized rule, but in accordance with policy considerations
flowing from the application of the specific substantive rule
governing the question under consideration. 153  In view of the
serious implications of the risk of non-persuasion, many litigants
certainly confront the questions posed by Wigmore. "Each
party wishes to know of what facts he has the risk of
nonpersuasion. By what considerations is this apportionment
determined? Is there any single principle or rule which will solve
all cases and afford a general test for ascertaining the incidence of
this risk? By no means."' 155
In sum, the doctrine of affirmative defense spawns uncertainty
in the question of who bears the burden of persuasion in both
criminal and civil cases.
147 Id.
148 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 587145.
149 Id.
15o Id.
15 Id.
152 See WIGMORE, supra note 7, at 291; KEANE, supra note 7, at 58.
153 See WIGMORE, supra note 7, at 291.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 287-88.
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3. The Effect of Constitutional Considerations
Lastly, it is appropriate to examine the effect of constitutional
considerations on the formulation of the burden of persuasion
rules. Serious constitutional questions are raised by the use of
affirmative defenses in criminal cases. 156  Recent years have
brought some developments with regard to the constitutionality of
the affirmative defense doctrine in criminal trials, cases, or
proceedings.157  Historically, many states in the United States
placed both the burden of persuasion and the burden of production
on the accused with regard to several classic affirmative defense,
including insanity and self-defense. 158  The real revolution in
thought with regard to affirmative defense occurred in the mid-
1970's with two pivotal Supreme Court decisions. 159 In Mullaney
v. Wilbur,160 the placement of the burden of reducing the degree of
a homicide on the defendant was said to violate the principle that
the due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged.16' Several state courts read this opinion as
constitutionally compelling the prosecution to bear the burden of
persuasion with regard to various affirmative defense.' 
62
However, the holding in Mullaney was limited by Patterson v.
New York.163 In Patterson, the Court decided the constitutionality
of the allocation of the burden of proof by a formalistic analysis of
state law; due process was not violated because the defendant did
not have the burden of proof on any fact that the state law had
identified as an element of the offense.164 Despite significant and
persistent criticism, the durability of this approach was confirmed
in Martin v. Ohio.165 "The analysis in Patterson and Martin deals
only with the allocation of the burden of persuasion. As suggested
by dicta in Patterson, the courts have had no trouble with an
156 See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 585-87.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
16o 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
161 Id. at 686; MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 585-87.
162 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 585-87.
163 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
164 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 586-87.
165 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
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affirmative defense that simply requires the defendant to bear a
burden of production."' 66 Some scholars think that in criminal
cases the prosecution should be required to disprove beyond all
reasonable doubt any justificatory defense that the defendant
might raise.' 
67
Although there are constitutional considerations involved in
the allocation of burdens of proof and the use of presumptions in
civil cases, some scholars are of the view that the problems are
simply not of the same magnitude. 68 In a criminal case, the scales
are balanced in favor of the defendant by the requirement that the
prosecution prove each element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Any rule that has even the appearance of
lightening that burden is viewed with the most extreme caution.'1 69
However, according to this approach, there is no need for special
protection for any one party to a civil action.1 70 The burdens of
proof are fixed at the pleading stage, not for constitutional reasons,
but for reasons of probability, social policy, and convenience. 171
I disagree with this approach. This article previously touched
upon the first seeds of a new legal policy found both in Israeli case
law and Israeli legal literature.1 72 This policy demurs regarding
the imposition of the burden of persuasion on the defendant in a
civil trial because of the constitutional protection of the
defendant's property rights. 173 Arguably, the defendant's property
right is countered by the plaintiffs own property right that there
be no change of circumstances in the interim period that could
impair his right should there be a post-facto judicial determination
that the plaintiffs right is substantial and intact. 174 However, it
would seem that the plaintiff's right is weaker than the defendant's
right because it has yet to be proven by way of fully fledged
evidence. 75 In U.S. law too, which protects the parties' rights by
166 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 530.
167 FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 87, at 149-51, 180-83.
168 MCCORMICK, supra note 7, at 583-84.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See Yuval Sinai, Burden of Persuasion in Civil Cases: A New Model, 24
MEHKERE MISHPAT (BAR ILAN LAW STUDIES) 165-92 (2008) [hereinafter A New Model].
173 Id. at 182-93.
174 Id.
175 Id.
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force of due process in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, there is evidence of a traditional tendency to provide
greater protection to the defendant against violation of his property
rights and other constitutional rights. 176  This tendency is
especially true where there is an attempt to negate the defendant's
property rights even before judgment is given against him or when
the jury awards prohibitively high sums in punitive damages. 177
Considerations of this type may also militate against imposing the
burden of persuasion on the defendant in situations of affirmative
defense.
D. Difficulties of the Affirmative Defense Doctrine -The
Economic Cost-Efficiency Perspective
The economic analysis of law approach provides that:
[A]djudicative fact-finding needs to be cost-
efficient. To maintain cost-efficiency, fact finders
need to minimize the total cost of errors and error-
avoidance. The value of the entitlements that the
legal system fails to enforce and the utility of
liabilities that it fails to impose determine the
errors' cost. The cost of error-avoidance is
comprised of the aggregate cost of trial and pretrial
procedures and decisions that enhance accuracy in
fact-finding. Fact-finding is efficient whenever it
minimizes the sum of the two costs. Fact finding is
inefficient whenever it fails to minimize this178
sum.
Is the doctrine of affirmative defense an appropriate doctrine
from the economic cost-efficiency aspect? Professor Posner
thinks that this doctrine is efficient, 7 9 but I disagree. Indeed, as
176 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
177 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)
(finding excessive punitive damages); BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)
(holding that punitive damages in a 500 : 1 ratio was excessive); N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (finding a violation of due process when defendant
was not granted a hearing or notice before garnishment of his property); Paul DeCamp,
Beyond State Farm: Due Process Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory Damages,
27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 231 (2004); but see Leubsdorf, supra note 30, at 588, 608-
10 (criticizing the tendency of protection of the defendant in order to avoid
discriminating against the plaintiff).
178 FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 87, at 141.
179 POSNER, supra note 17, at 618.
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Posner asserted, "[i]t would be particularly inefficient to require
the plaintiff to anticipate and produce evidence contravening the
indefinite number of defenses that a defendant might plead in a
given case. Such a requirement would also force the plaintiff to
do the defendant's legal research for him."' 80 However, this
argument is not persuasive enough to justify adopting the doctrine
of affirmative defense. At the most, this argument is relevant for
the allocation of the burden of production; as "[a]t the trial stage,
the production burden requires the party with the best access to
evidence to produce that evidence."' f81 As a matter of fact, Alex
Stein showed that "[flrom the efficiency perspective
defendants only need to bear the burden of adducing evidence (the
production burden) in relation to any defense not qualifying as an
excuse."' 182 Thus, the cost-efficiency aspect does not lead to the
main consequence of the affirmative defense doctrine-the
allocation of the burden of persuasion to the defendant. There are
other costs of the affirmative defense that were not taken into
account by Posner.
Attaining the goal of efficient fact-finding, as Stein asserts,
requires addressing two obstacles.' 83  The first obstacle is the
difference between the private and social benefits that adjudication
engenders.' 8 4 This difference is responsible for the fundamental
misalignment between the private incentives that operate in
adjudication and the social desiderata.185 In criminal trials, for
example, society is interested in convicting the guilty and in
acquitting the innocent. Naturally, guilty defendants have a
different motivation. These defendants do not assist the discovery
of the truth and often attempt to prevent it. Innocent defendants'
incentives also do not support social interest. These defendants
only care about their own acquittals and expenses. Unnecessary
civil litigation features a similar misalignment between social and
180 Id. at 618; see also Lee, supra note 7, at 33 (suggesting economic theories which
might explain the doctrine of affirmative defense but stressing in his conclusion: "The
economic model developed in this Article cannot provide an easy answer as to how to
balance the cost considerations identified above ... this article does not provide any
universal maxim for the assignment of legal burdens in all cases.").
181 FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 8787, at 154.
182 Id. at 151.
183 Id. at 141.
184 Id.
185 Id.
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private interests. Here, too, society is interested in minimizing the
incidence of both false negatives (erroneous refusals to impose
liability) and false positives (erroneous impositions of liability).
Litigants, however, have an altogether different objective in mind.
Both plaintiffs and defendants chase trial victory and the
corresponding private gain irrespective of the truth. They do not
care about the social interest that civil adjudication elevates.
186
The second obstacle of the cost-efficiency doctrine concerns
private information. 187 Parties and witnesses hold unobservable
information, which remains private throughout the trial. 188 "The
private nature of such information ... creates an opportunity for
cheating that litigants can exploit. Litigants ... not only have the
motive to behave opportunistically ... more often than not, they
have the opportunity and the means ... [T]o tackle this problem,
the legal system needs to discourage opportunistic behavior."'
189
In this context, Section B discussed the shortcomings of the
evidence accessibility test from the perspective of economic
efficiency, insofar as it fails to provide positive incentives to the
honest litigant, and to those who fear disclosing facts that are
prejudicial to them.
The previous chapter showed that there are other costs of the
affirmative defense doctrine that were not taken into account by
Posner. 190 The affirmative defense doctrine spawns uncertainty in
the question of who bears the burden of persuasion in both civil
and criminal cases, causing the waste of valuable judicial time. In
this context, there have already been those who have noted the
prohibitive costs, in economic terms, occasioned by the complex
rules governing the burden of persuasion, from which the judge
must choose in each and every case. 191 However, it would seem
that the inefficiency is not expressed only in the waste of judicial
time; it also finds expression in difficulties created by the conduct
of parties whose litigation strategy is governed by their fear of
being trapped into confession and avoidance situations. As noted
186 Id.
187 Id. at 141-42.
188 Id. at 142-43.
189 Id. at 143.
190 See generally POSNER, supra note 17, at 618; see also Lee, supra note 7
(containing the same lack of discussion of other costs of the affirmative defense doctrine
as Posner).
191 FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 87, at 343 n.39.
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above, this concern induces the parties to adopt "hidden cards"
litigation,' 92 untruthful pleadings, and to wantonly create
difficulties both for the court and the rival party. Clearly, this
situation places an onerous burden on the court in its efforts to
uncover the truth, and significantly increases the costs of the
proceeding. These costs would have been saved had the
governing procedural-evidential doctrine been to encourage the
parties to enter truthful pleadings. The next part of this article
proposes such a doctrine.
Il. The Jewish Law Perspective
In Part III, the article will present an alternative procedural
model based on the principles of Jewish law. This section will
scrutinize the principal legal foundations of the Jewish doctrine,
"he who takes from his friend bears the burden of proof ' 193 and
the doctrine of migo, both of which possess foundational status in
Jewish legal procedure.1 94  This section will analyze their
advantages in comparison with the burden of persuasion rules
endorsed by common law.
A. "He who takes from his friend bears the Burden of Proof"
1. The Elements of the Rule and Its Advantages
Under the principle of "he who takes from his friend bears the
burden of proof' (ha-mozi mi-havero alav ha-re'ayah), in a
plaintiffs action to take something from the defendant, the
plaintiff is required to prove his right of claim, unless there is a
legal presumption (praesumptio juris) which exempts him from
proving his claim.' 95 Naturally, but not always (as explained in
the following), this rule dictates the order of pleading, and hence
as a rule the plaintiff begins with the submission of proof. TheSages' 97 regarded this principle as a "fundamental principle in
192 Hidden cards litigation refers to litigation where one does not reveal facts that do
not support the litigants' claims. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 32, at 366.
193 See ZEVIN, supra note 51, at 455.
194 See Yehuda Yifrach, Migo-Al Ha'TeferShay'Bin Ta 'ana L 'Rayah (Migo-On
the Border of a Claim and Evidence), in MISHPETEI ERETZ: TEYANOT V'RAYAOT (LAWS
OF ISRAEL: EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS) 349 (2005).
195 See ZEVIN, supra note 51, at 451-59.
196 See SHULCHAN ARUCH, HOSHEN MISHPAT 24.1 (as per the Halakhic ruling in
TALMUD, BAVA KAMA 46b).
197 The Tanna 'im & Amora 'im-the Rabbis of the Mishnah and Talmud. See NAHUM
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law,"'198 based both on verses in the Bible and on common
sense.
199
The Sages deduced from the Biblical verse "jiudge
righteously"2°° this principle: "The righteous litigant brings a just
claim and offers just evidence., 20 1 For example: A is wrapped in
his cloak while B says, "it is mine"; A plows with his cow, while B
says "It is mine"; A holds possession of his field while B says, "It
is mine"; A dwells in his house, while B says, "It is my house."
Hence, Scripture says: "and judge righteously" - the righteous
litigant brings a just claim and offers just evidence [and regarding
all of them it states that the plaintiff must bring proof] .202
Indeed, no principle seems more logical and more justified
than the principle dictating the imposition of the burden of proof
on the plaintiff. In the Talmud,2 °3 Ray Ashi bases this rule on
logic and common sense, comparing it to a situation where a
person goes to the doctor indicating where it hurts, rather than the
doctor running around to seek out the sick.20 4 This is also
applicable to a plaintiff with a claim against his friend.20 5 The
plaintiff must bring proof to substantiate his claim, and the
defendant is not required to initially prove that he owes anything
RAKOVER, THE SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW 15 (1994).
198 See TALMUD, BAVA KAMA 46a.
199 See RABBI SHMUEL BAR-NAHMANI, TALMUD, BAVA KAMA, (basing this principle
on the Biblical verse "whosoever hath a cause, let him come near unto them." Exodus
24:14).
200 Deuteronomy 1:16 (Finkelstein ed.).
201 Id.
202 See id. The conclusion in brackets is according to the version appearing in the
Midrash Tannaim.
203 See TALMUD, BAVA KAMA 46b.
204 Id.
205 See, SHALOM ALBECK, HA'RAYAOT B'DAYNEI HA'TALMUD (EVIDENCE IN
TALMUDIC LAW) 324 (1987). This work attempted to give a probability based
explanation to the rule that "the plaintiff bears the burden of proof"; it states the
following: Why does the defendant in possession win and the plaintiff lose, despite their
equivalence in terms of evidence and pleadings? The reason is based on an empirical
majority-based presumption. In the majority of real life situations, the concrete situation
in reality also reflects the situation in law, and where a person challenges that reality,
seeking to change it-in the majority of real life situations his claims are not legally
based, and only in the minority of cases is his claim legally substantiated. Consequently,
if the plaintiff lacks proof that is stronger than the majority based presumption, by law he
will lose. The question, however, is whether Albeck's probability based presumption has
any empiric basis. Furthermore, why should one necessarily rely on the (presumed)
majority of cases? Perhaps the determinative majority should be the majority of law
suits. Consequently, it is difficult to accept the probability foundation as the basis for the
rule the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. Id.
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with respect to the claim.2 °6
The rule of "he who takes from his friend bears the burden of
proof" has two meanings: (a) when the defendant is not currently
in possession, but where the item was his before the doubt arose,
referred to as hezkat mara kamma ("original owner's possession
right"); or (b) when the defendant physically possesses the matter
under discussion, which is referred to as "the possessory right"
(hezkat mammon).2 °7
Essentially, these two rights are legal presumptions (hazakot),
and Halakhic authorities dealt extensively with their relation to the
rule that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.20 8 It is important
to note that the "original owner's possession right" means that
money whose ownership is in doubt is presumed to belong to the
previous owner, even if he is not currently in possession thereof,
and "the possessory right" means that money whose ownership is
in doubt will not be removed from the person in possession
thereof.20
9
It bears emphasizing that there is a difference between the
principle of "he who takes from his friend bears the burden of
proof' in its Jewish law accepted meaning, and the principle of
common law (and other legal traditions) that the Burden of Proof
is with the plaintiff. The common law principle that the burden of
proof is assigned to the plaintiff is based on a pleading-subjective
test; the party who initiates the action or proceeding bears the
burden of proof.210 However, the Talmudic principle of "he who
takes from his friend bears the burden of proof' is based on an
objective test-the possession of the objects under dispute. 211
Therefore, according to Jewish law, sometimes the plaintiff does
not bear the burden of proof, such as when the defendant's objects
are in the plaintiffs possession.
2 12
It emerges that the principle that "he who takes from his friend
bears the burden of proof' does not only refer to and rely upon the
right conferred by physical possession of the asset, but also
206 Id.
207 See ZEVIN, supra note 5 1, at 455.
208 See id. at 451-59.
209 See id. at 455.
210 TREATISE, supra note 4, at 369.
211 See ZEVIN, supra note 51, at 455.
212 Id.
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derives from the interest in preserving legal stability and security.
This consideration dictates the preservation of the status quo, as
the litigant seeking to alter the status quo bears the obligation of
persuading the court that it is appropriate to do so.
213
A number of powerful considerations underlie the rule that "he
who takes from his friend bears the burden of proof." The rule is
just and moral, and it preserves legal stability and security.
Moreover, in terms of economic efficiency, it appears that this is
the most desirable rule with respect to the burden of persuasion in
civil cases. Professor Kraus examined the possibility of imposing
the burden of persuasion on the party attempting to change the
status quo, and rejected it, claiming that it does not provide a
rationale that promotes aggregate efficiency. 2 14 However, on this
count Professor Stein has argued that this assumption is mistaken;
his unequivocal conclusion is that from the perspective of
economic theory, it is the plaintiff who should bear the burden of
persuasion.215
The principle is the following:
The plaintiffs burden in an ordinary civil case is to
show that his position is more likely than not
correct . . . This makes a plaintiff who gives no
evidence very likely to lose; so it makes sense, as a
way of economizing on the time of the tribunal (as
well as of reducing nuisance litigation), to require
the plaintiff, as the precondition to getting to trial,
to submit evidence that if believed would be likely
to carry the day with the jury, before the defendant
is required to submit any evidence.
2 16
Some scholars present further economic efficiency
justifications for the default rule that assigns the burden of proof to
the plaintiff.217  Finally, it bears mentioning that even in
Bentham's writings, it is suggested that the plaintiff should bear
213 Id.
214 Kraus, supra note 81, at 142 n.43.
215 See generally Sales Litigation, supra note 85 (arguing against Kraus' assertions).
216 POSNER, supra note 17, at 617-18 (assuming that the cost to the plaintiff of
obtaining this evidence is not disproportionately greater than the cost to the defendant of
obtaining contrary evidence (if there is any). But, as Posner wrote, this assumption is
reasonable; modem pretrial procedures for discovering evidence in the possession of the
opposing party make the costs of searching for evidence fairly symmetrical).
217 Lee, supra note 7, at 12-15.
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the burden of persuasion, because he is the one who is liable to
benefit from the judicial decision.218
2. Deviation from the Rule-Considerations of Its Legal
Policy
Quite often, legal policy considerations dictate the imposition
of the burden of persuasion on a particular party, even if, from a
strictly legal perspective, that party cannot be regarded as a person
"taking" from his friend. A number of examples can be cited for
deviation from the rule that "he who takes from his friend bears
the burden of proof' by virtue of special considerations, and this
section presents three classic ones.
The first example is the Talmudic case 219 known as the rule of
Mari bar Isak. According to this rule, if the court deems that
witnesses are afraid to give testimony because the defendant is a
violent person, it may impose the burden of proof on the violent
defendant in order to force him to ensure that the witnesses are
brought, notwithstanding that they will not necessarily testify in
his favor.2 As such, it is a prima facie contradiction to the rule
that "he who takes from his friend bears the burden of proof.,
221
An interesting broadening of the Mari bar Isak ruling was given
effect in a ruling of the Tel-Aviv Rabbinical Court. The case
concerned a divorce action filed by a husband against his wife by
reason of her illness.223 The Rabbinical Court ruled that even
though the husband generally bears the burden of proof (to prove
grounds for divorce), the only way of proving his claim in this
case was by examination of the wife, because she had prevented
the doctors from testifying regarding her sickness. 224 The
rabbinical court therefore imposed the burden of proof on her.
225
This rationale is similar to one of the principles of the evidential
damage doctrine, which can shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant whenever the latter is responsible for inflicting
218 J. BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 195-96 (1825) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL EVIDENCE]; but see Bentham, supra note 82 (presenting a different position).
219 See TALMUD, BAVA MEZIA 39b.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 See Judgments of the Rabbinical Courts of the State of Israel vol.7, at 224.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
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evidential damage on the plaintiff.226 Indeed, the shifting of the
burden of proof to the defendant in the context of tort law was
mentioned by one of the great Halakhic authorities of the last
generation, who was of the opinion that in cases where the
plaintiff incurred damages in an event where the defendant was
present, the defendant bears the burden to prove that he did not
cause the damage.227 It bears mentioning that a similar approach
was presented by one of the contemporary legal scholars that
suggested an economic-cost-efficiency justification for departing
from the default rule (that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof)
"in cases in which defendants are statistically likely to be
liable. 228
A second example of deviation from the rule that "he who
takes from his friend bears the burden of proof' concerns cases
where the evidence supporting the plaintiffs claims is in the hands
of the party in possession (i.e. the defendant), and the plaintiff
proves that only the defendant in possession is capable of bringing
the evidence in support of the plaintiff's claims. 229 In such a case
the rabbinical court may impose the burden of proof on the
defendant.
230
In the common law adversarial system, where the tribunal does
not participate in the search for evidence, there is great importance
in the burden of producing evidence to the tribunal, as distinct
from the burden of persuading. 231 However, in Jewish law, the
court is inquisitorial in many respects, so the distinction between
the two aspects of the burden of proof is not as clearly emphasized
as it is in the adversarial system. Nevertheless, though an
unequivocal determination is problematic, in the cases mentioned
above it might seem that the burden transferred is that of
producing evidence, whereas the burden of persuasion stays
permanently with the plaintiff.232  As such, even according to
226 See generally ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 160-206 (Oxford University Press 2001) [hereinafter PORAT] (identifying
the legal doctrines that handle the evidential damage problem).
227 See HAZON ISH, TALMUD, BAVA KAMA, 7:7.
228 Lee, supra note 7, at 27.
229 See SHULCHAN.ARUCH, HOSHEN MISHPAT 16.3.
230 Id.
231 POSNER, supra note 17.
232 See BAVA MEZIA, supra note 219 (regarding the first case in which there was a
dispute between the Rishonim on the question of the burden born by the violent litigant:
Is he obliged to actually find the witnesses or also to ensure that they testify explicitly in
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some of the Halakhic authorities in Jewish law, a distinction must
be made between the burden of persuasion and the burden of
bringing proof, but this matter requires further examination, which
is beyond the scope of the present article.
A third and final example pertains to a particularly
controversial issue in modem law, namely, who carries the burden
of proof in appeals on tax assessments. For comparative purposes,
one should recall that in English law it is accepted that the burden
of proving overpayment of tax is generally imposed on the
assessee. 233 In the United States, on the other hand, even though
the law has traditionally adopted this approach,234 in 1998,
Congress pushed through a legislative reform on the issue, the
framework of which determined that under certain circumstances
the burden would be transferred to the State. 235 This would occur,
for example, where the assessee presents reliable evidence
concerning a relevant factual issue. 236 On the other hand, it has
also been claimed that the change is not as drastic as it seems.237
Another view is that the exception is broad to the extent of
"swallowing" the basic rule regarding the imposition of the burden
on the assessee.238
What then is Jewish law's position on the matter? The strict
interpretation is that the rule "he who takes from his friend bears
the burden of proof' applies to both actions against an individual
and actions between an individual and the community.239 The
his favor?).
233 See, e.g., Eagerpath Ltd. V. Edwards (Inspector of Taxes), [2001] S.T.C. 26, [4]
(Eng.) (explaining that the assessee's special knowledge of his business affairs and
profits is a reason for imposing the burden on him).
234 See, e.g., United States v. Janis 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1997) (holding that the
burden of proof of tax overpayment was on the assessee).
235 26 I.R.C. § 7491 (2008).
236 26 U.S.C.S. § 7491 (2008); see generally Joni Larson, Burden of Proof in the
Tax Court after the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 and Shea v.
Commissioner, 36 GONZ. L. REv. 49 (2001) (analyzing the rules of the reform); Bryan T.
Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the
IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2004) (analyzing the rules
of reform).
237 See generally Adriana Wos-Mysliwiec, The Internal Revenue Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998: Does It Really Shift the Burden of Proof to the IRS?, 14 ST. JOHN'S
J.L. COMM. 301 (1999) (arguing that the rules of reform do not have as great of an
impact as anticipated).
238 See Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and
Realities of the New Burden-ofProofRules, 84 IowA L. REV. 413, 414 (1999).
239 See ZEVtN, supra note 51, at 455.
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community is powerless to enact regulations against this
overarching rule.24°  In fact, an ancient rule in Jewish
communities, rooted in the early Middle Ages, was that in appeals
against tax assessments collected by the community, "any person
who claims that he has no obligation, must first pay and then
adjudicate.,, 241 This matter was addressed by Maharam of
Rothenburg, one of the leading poskim242 in the medieval period,
regarding the Jewish custom.2 4  Maharam stated that:
[T]ax matters depend neither on reasoning nor on
the law set forth in the Talmud, but on the custom
of the locality. It seems to me that the practice in
all the communities with which I have become
acquainted is that whenever an individual has a
dispute with his community concerning tax matters
the community first collects the tax. Afterwards, if
he so desires, they will submit to adjudication the
issue of whether they took more from him than is
lawful and if so the judges will order them to return
it. The community wishes to be considered as the
party in possession-as the defendant and not the
plaintiff. Thus even when the taxpayer has retained
possession [of the sum in dispute] the burden of
proof nevertheless rests with the taxpayer and not
the community.
244
This approach was codified as settled Jewish Law in the
Shulkhan Aruch, to the effect that in disputes between the
community and the individual in tax matters, the "community are
240 Id.
241 See RABBI SHLOMO BEN-ADERET, TESHUVOT HARASHBA (THE RASHBA'S
QUESTIONS), vol. 3, n.398 (attesting to this kind of regulation in Barcelona). The
regulation is attributed to as ancient an authority as Rabbenu Gershom, the Luminary of
the Diaspora; see Responsa Maharik no.17, MAHARIK HACHADASHIM (THE NEW
MAHARIK) (Jerusalem 1970); Responsa R. Benjamin b. Mattathias, Greece (first half of
16th century) (Jerusalem, 1959) n.29; see also Menachem Elon, Taxation,
ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 863-65 (1975).
242 Poskim are religious legal scholars who decide issues of the Halakha (religious
law) when other sources of the law are inconclusive or otherwise vague. See ZvI CAHN,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUDAISM 408 (1962).
243 See RABBI MEIR B. BARUCH, RESPONSA MAHARAM ROTHENBERG, IV Prague
Collection (M.A. Bloch, ed.; Budapest: J. Steinberg, 1895; Reprint: Tel Aviv, 1969),
nos. 106, 915; MORDEKHAI, TALMUD, BAVA BATHRA 174.
244 See BARUCH, supra note 243, at n. 106, 915.
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regarded as being in possession with respect to the individual. 245
Regarding the reason for this custom of the community being the
party in possession, Maharam of Rothenburg writes, inter alia:
If this were not the law, everyone would declare to
his community: 'I am exempt according to the law'
or 'I have paid my tax', and if you wish to take it
from me, I will take an oath that I have paid it, or
you will [have to] swear [that I did not pay it].
Then, rather than have every member of the
community take an oath concerning his small share
[of the disputed tax] the community would choose
to relinquish its claim, and as a result, the
community will suffer lOSS!246
Maharam of Rothenburg also adds that if the community was
not regarded as being in possession with respect to the individual,
then the public would have no remedy; everyone could act
wrongfully thinking that no one would sue him because the
custom is that an individual takes greater efforts to prove his claim
than does the public.247 A number of sources illustrate that the
Sages protected the loss of the public.248 The comments of
Maharam of Rothenburg thus indicate that the rule that in tax
matters the public is considered to be "in possession" and hence
the doctrine of the burden of proof is not generally applied to the
public, in economic-social considerations.
B. The Migo Doctrine
1. General Foundations
Jewish procedural law recognizes two stages in the judicial
process: the pleadings of the litigants, which are conducted orally
245 See SHULCHAN ARUCH, HOSHEN MISHPAT 4.1.
246 See BARUCH, supra note 243, at nos.106, 915; but see Ben Aderet, supra note
241 ("Indeed it has been enacted everywhere that no-one may declare 'I will not pay
until there is an adjudication on my claim of non-liability', as otherwise everyone will
make such a declaration, and the tax will never be collected to the profit of the
swindlers").
247 See TALMUD, BAVA BATHRA 24b (regarding which Maharam cites the well
known Talmudic aphorism, "a pot with two cooks is neither hot nor cold").
248 See BARUCH, supra note 243, at n.106; TALMUD, BAVA BATHRA 24b;
MORDEKHA, TALMUD, BAVA BATHRA 174.
249 See BARUCH, supra note 243, at no.106.
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at the court session, and the stage of submitting evidence. 25' The
pleadings of the litigants are not regarded as part of the evidence
because according to Jewish law a person cannot testify for
himself.251  The oral pleading is one of the most important
elements of the judicial process, and the decision may already be
given at that stage, even before the parties have been permitted to
present their evidence. 252  In the framework of the Laws of
Pleadings (toen ve-nit'aan) there are laws which are partially
based on logic and partially on life experience. The court
evaluates the litigants' pleadings, and to the extent that the
pleadings are substantiated and assisted by these rules, the litigant
has a greater chance of succeeding in his claim. 253 The evaluation
of claims is not purely, a matter for the exercise of the court's
judicial discretion according to its own subjective evaluation of
the witnesses and their testimony. 254 Testimony must also comply
with a number of rules which are conditions for its admissibility,
or else the claims may be questioned by the litigant.255 Next, this
article discusses the general foundations of migo, and does not
purport to exhaust this extensive and complex subject.
2 56
The most important rules of migo are based on common sense
and logic. 257 The meaning of the migo plea is that the claimant
250 See, e.g., Jewish Law, supra note 1 (in the framework of the rabbinical courts
jurisdiction in the State of Israel, the parties must submit a written statement of action,
but this does not exempt them from the need to orally state their claims at the beginning
of the litigation, as specified in The Rabbinical Courts Procedure Regulations, §60, 62
(1993)).
251 See TALMUD, YEBAMOTH 25b (telling that a person is close to himself and
relatives are disqualified as witnesses); SHULCHAN ARUCH, HOSHEN MISHPAT 33 (the
approach in Jewish law is that the litigant is not a witness as distinct from what is
accepted in other legal systems, which enables the litigant to testify in his own case).
252 See Yuval Sinai, Practice and Procedure, 16 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 436-37
(2007) [hereinafter Practice and Procedure].
253 See ASHER GULAK, YESODEI HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI (The Foundations of Hebrew
Trial) 73 (vol.4, Tel-Aviv, 1967).
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 The subject of migo has been treated extensively in Hebrew research literature of
Jewish law. See, e.g., GULACK, supra note 253, at 101-08; Meir D. Cohen, The Migo
Doctrine, 11 SINAI 247, 252 (1942-43); Yosef Rivlin, Migo---Evidence in Jewish Law,
(1978) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, Tel-Aviv University); ALBECK, supra note 205,
at 172-80; Yesahayahu Ben-Pazzi, Mahoot Ha 'Ta 'anah B "Mishpat Ha 'Ivri (The Essence
of "'the Claim" in Jewish Law), 6 MEGAL 97-114 (1988); Yifrach, supra note 194, at
349-50.
257 See generally GULACK, supra note 253, at 101-08; Cohen, supra note 256;
Rivlin, supra note 256; ALBECK, supra note 205; Ben-Pazzi, supra note 256; Yifrach,
supra note 194, at 349-50 (addressing the extensive treatment of the subject of migo in
Hebrew research regarding Jewish law).
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making a certain claim will be believed, because had he wished to
lie, he could have told a better lie, which would have been
258believed. In other words, because he could have made a
stronger claim, and he waived the chance, he is believed regarding
the claim he actually made.259
The migo doctrine is entirely different from the confession and
avoidance claim or the affirmative defense doctrine, and the two
doctrines produce diametrically opposed results.26 °  The
confession and avoidance doctrine splits the defendant's claim,
accepting its confession admission component and requiring him
to prove the avoidance component as an affirmative defense. 261
The migo doctrine views the defendant's claims-both those that
he made and those which he could have made-as one integral,
indivisible unit.262 For instance, consider the classic example of
the defendant who claims, "I paid" (paraati), in the refutation of a
debt claim for which the plaintiff adduced no proof.263 Whereas
under the doctrine of confession and avoidance, the burden of
persuasion would be transferred to the defendant, under Jewish
law the defendant would be believed,264 because given that the
plaintiff had no proof, the defendant could have told a lie and said
"No such thing ever occurred., 265  Had he made that, he would
have been believed, and this being so, he should also be believed
when he claimed, "I paid," which is a weaker claim because he
concedes the existence of a debt, claiming only that he has paid
it.266  This means that the litigant whose case is impaired by a
weak claim can be assisted by the migo option if available; and if
258 See GULACK, supra note 253, at 101-08.
259 Id.
260 Cohen has already pointed out that migo is one of the legal concepts that has no
parallel in other ancient legal systems of other nations, chief among them in Roman law.
Cohen, supra note 256.
261 KOFFLER ET AL., supra note 19, at 551-58.
262 See GULACK, supra note 253, at 101-08.
263 Id.
264 See, e.g., TALMUD, YEBAMOTH 25b; SHULCHAN ARUCH., HOSHEN MISHPAT 33(clarifying that the use of the word "believed" may be confusing for the reader not
familiar with Jewish law because believability or credibility in modem law is a feature
pertaining to witnesses and testimony, and not to the claim in and of itself. However, for
current purposes I have used the term "believed" in accordance with its connotation in
Jewish law, and with respect to claims made by the litigants, even though-as indicated
at the beginning of this section-Jewish law makes a clear distinction between litigants
and witnesses).
265 See GULACK, supra note 253, at 101-08.
266 Id.
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the other party does not have any evidence, the party pleading
267icneithtiJeihlw
migo will win the case. The significance is that in Jewish law,
the defendant claiming "I paid" is not required to prove his claim
and is believed, and the burden of proof remains with the
plaintiff.2 68 Regarding this point, Meir D. Cohen has noted that in
other legal systems we do not find the migo procedure, which
gives force to an "eventual claim," because in so far as it was not
expressed, no weight attaches to it, and all claims and defenses are
evaluated exclusively in terms of their internal consistency and
internal logic. 269  The following chapter will elaborate on the
rationale underlying the migo doctrine.
The term migo does not appear in Tannaitic literature, but the
rule of ha-peh she-asar hu ha-peh she-hitir (the mouth that
forbade is the mouth that permitted), is mentioned, and has been
accepted by many of the traditional commentators as well as by
modern scholars, as being substantively identical to the migo claim
mentioned in Talmudic sources. 27 According to the principle that
"the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted," a person who
informed us of something which we would not have known of
from any other source other than him ("the mouth that forbade") is
believed for purposes of eliminating the consequences of his first
statement ("is the mouth that permitted"), because all of the
information at the court's disposal regarding the litigant's
obligation comes from him, and he is therefore believed for
purposes of limiting or interpreting the scope of the information
that he himself supplied.2 7 ' The choice of the court is either to
accept the words of the litigant, in their entirety, i.e. the debt and
its defrayal, or not to accept them at all.272
A classic example of where the court makes this kind of
decision appears in the Mishnah.273 David tells Solomon that the
field now in David's possession used to belong to Solomon's
father, but David bought it from him.274 According to the
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Cohen, supra note 256, at 248.
270 See, MEIRI, BETH HABECHIRA, KETHUBOTH 1 5b.
271 See ZEVIN, supra note 195, at 733-35.
272 Id.
273 KETHUBOTH 2.2.
274 Id.
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affirmative defense doctrine, this is a classic confession and
avoidance claim; David should be believed with respect to his
admission that the field once belonged to Solomon's father, but
should not have been believed with respect to his additional
statement that he purchased the field from Solomon's father,
unless he proved that fact with convincing evidence.275 Under the
Talmudic doctrine "the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that
permits," David's claim that he purchased the field is believed,
even in the absence of any additional proof because it was David's
"mouth" that established in the first place that the field had
belonged to Solomon's father. In its absence, one would not have
known that Solomon had any right at all to the field because he
has no witnesses that it belonged to his father.276 Consequently,
the reader is also prepared to believe David's claim (to permit)
that he purchased the field from the previous owners.277 Naturally,
if the knowledge of Solomon's right did not originate in David but
in witnesses brought by Solomon as evidence of the field having
belonged to his father, then David's claim of rightful ownership
would not be believed on the strength of his statement alone, and
he would have to adduce further proof, by witnesses or a bill of
sale.278
The Talmud states that the principle of "the mouth that forbade
is the mouth that permitted" is based on common sense and
logic, 279 both of which compel the conclusion that if the actual
right to the field was established exclusively by their testimony,
then the mouth that established the right should also be relied upon
to claim that the right no longer exists (or to permit the
prohibition).280 What this means is that the peh she-asar doctrine
is nothing more than a litigant's admission to facts, which inure,
either fully or partially, to the benefit of his opponent, but which
the litigant supplements with further facts in his favor, and by
which he should win his trial despite his admission. The litigant is
able to deny all the facts against him, claiming that "no such thing
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 See TALMUD, KETHUBOTH 2.5 (the principle of ha-peh she asar is not only
applicable to civil law, but also applied in the realm of ritual law (issur ve-heter)).
279 See TALMUD, KETuuBoTH 22a.
280 Id.
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ever occurred," and he would be believed because there are no
witnesses.281 Since the litigant did not make the claim but instead
admitted to his rival litigant the facts that if not admitted to would
not have been proved, he is therefore believed regarding the
additional facts claimed in his favor.
The rules of migo and its limitations have been dealt with at
length in numerous works 282 of prominent authorities in Jewish
law who elaborated the cases in which the rule can be used and in
which it cannot.283 In the following comments, this article will
adumbrate some of the rules which attest to the role of migo in
Jewish law as a law located at the crossroads between the laws of
pleadings and evidentiary law.
284
The migo claim is limited to being a plea in defense and not a
claim by which a plaintiff can win his trial.285 It is not considered
powerful evidence and generally valued as logical proof to be
considered by the court when assessing the parties' pleadings and
in the absence of more substantial evidence. It must be stressed
that not only is the migo doctrine consistent with the rule of "he
who takes from his friend bears the burden of proof," the migo
doctrine also supplements and fortifies the rule, because it
strengthens the defendant's claims in cases in which he does not
have evidence.287 Halakhic codifiers generally endorse the broad
rule that "we do not use migo in order to extract [money],
288
because in order to win a trial, the party taking from his friend
must provide positive evidence for his claims, and the migo does
not constitute that kind of evidence.289  According to another
281 Id.
282 See, e.g., R. SHIMON MEKINON, TRACTATE KERITUT 372-83 (1965); SHULCHAN
ARUCH., HOSHEN MISHPAT 82.
283 See ARYE KARLIN, TORAT HOSHEN HAMISHPAT (FOUNDATIONS OF THE TORAH IN
THE COURT) 60 (1947) (proposing a reasonable explanation for the proliferation of rules,
most of which restrict and qualify the use of migo). In Karlin's view, cheats and liars
illicitly used migo as a loophole for evading their debts and commitments. Reliance on
claims without witnesses became widespread, creating a stumbling block for the wicked.
It was therefore appropriate and necessary to restrict and qualify the migo rule. Id.
284 This issue exceeds the boundaries of this study. See, e.g., Yifrach, supra note
194, at 377-79 (elaborating on the effects that the idea of migo has had on presenting
claims in Jewish law).
285 See SHULCHAN ARUCH, HOSHEN MISHPAT 82:12.
286 See id.
287 See supra Part III.B.2.
288 See SHULCHAN ARUCH, HOSHEN MISHPAT supra note 285.
289 A different explanation is offered by ALBECK, supra note 205, at 176:
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foundational rule, migo does not stand up against another piece of
substantial evidence.
In cases in which there is no evidence, the court is entitled to
decide in reliance on the migo rules, which evaluate the litigants'
claims purely by force of their internal logic. 291 Insofar as the
migo doctrine's probative power lies exclusively in its logic, it is
incumbent upon the court to be cautious in relying on the doctrine,
and establish clear boundaries, which define the scope of its use
and immunize the court from mistake and exaggeration. 292  As
such, in cases in which the court deems that the migo claim is not
suited for the matter at hand, leading to mistaken conclusions, the
judges can reject it as misguided logic and rely on their own
discretion.
293
2. Two Legal Models: The Credibility of the Claim
Doctrine and The Potentiality of the Claim Doctrine
The comments below focus on two categories of claims that
have received recognition in writings of scholars of Jewish law,294
and which also may be at the basis of the migo doctrine.
The first model is the doctrine of the "credibility of the Claim"
and is connected to a frequently cited Talmudic maxim in the
context of migo: "Why should I lie" (Ma li leshaker).295 Indeed
this is the simplest and most frequently cited explanation of migo.
Its import is that the plaintiffs claim will be accepted without
The reason for this is that the migo can only apply when he admits the facts
claimed by the rival party, and accordingly the rival party must begin the
pleading, so that the other party can admit to his claims. This means that it is
the plaintiff who must begin the pleadings. It emerges therefore that the
plaintiffs claims cannot be believed by force of migo, because this would
mean admitting to the defendant's claims, and the defendant has not yet made
his claims, and he may claim that 'such a thing never o'curred', or 'I have no
quarrel with you.'
290 See Gulack, supra note 253, at 105-06 (the Halakhic authorities therefore
determined that the migo is not effective where the claim (supported by migo) is
contested by witnesses, or where there is a bill of proof, or where it contradicts a
probable presumption).
291 See GULAK, supra note 253, at 107-08.
292 Id.
293 See SEAFTEI COHEN, HOSHEN MISHPAT (FOUNDATIONS OF THE COURT) 82 ("You
must know that in a number of cases the migo is rejected as a mistaken supposition").
294 See OZAR MEFARSHEI HATALMUD, BAVA MEZIA (COLLECTION OF COMMENTARY
ON THE TALMUD) 48 n.303 (Shemuel Kibelviz, ed. 1998) (listing numerous sources
treating this issue, primarily in the literature of Aharonim (Halakhic authorities of the
past few centuries)). This topic is expanded on by Rivlin, supra note 256, at 376-78.
295 See TALMUD, BAVA BATRA 5:2.
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requiring proof because it is assisted by a migo-namely that had
he wished to lie, he could have made an even stronger claim.
296
The litigant who does not lie should not be in a worse position
than the litigant who may be lying, but who would at some events
be believed. 97 In other words, "the credibility of the claim"
doctrine helps establish the reliability of the claim that was
actually made by the litigant and significantly influences the laws
of evidence.298
The second model, the doctrine of "potentiality of the claim,"
examines an array of claims that the litigant could have made; it is
a more complex model and requires more extensive
explanation. 299  According to this doctrine, the total number of
pleadings that a person could have raised attests to the degree of
power and possession that the litigant has over the money; if a
certain claim had the power to totally refute the claims of his
friend, and yet he made a weaker claim, it indicates that his
possession of the money carries greater weight than his friend's
possession, and as such, his friend bears the burden of proof. The
second model was developed and refined primarily by Lithuanian
Heads of Yeshiva in the previous century, but it has its roots in
301
earlier sources.
The question that arises in the potentiality doctrine is why the
court should even relate to a potential claim that was neither made
nor is even supported by a factual foundation its entire power
residing in the circumstances in which it was made.
Two approaches have been offered by rabbinical authorities
over the last generations. 3 02 One approach is that of Rabbi Shlomo
296 See GULAK, supra note 253, at 102; ALBECK, supra note 205, at 172.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 See, e.g., R. SHIMON YEHUDA SHKOPP, TALMUD, BAVA MEZIA s. 5 (providing an
explanation of this model in Jewish Rabbinical literature).
3oo The most prominent of them being R. Shimon Yehuda Shkopp, who repeats this
idea a number of places, emphasizing the distinction between this and what we have
referred to as the "credibility of the claim" doctrine. See, e.g., id. (there were other Heads
of Yeshiva too who substantiated and refined the "potential of the claim" doctrine-
which they variously refer to as "power" or "right" or "claim" or "credibility"). See, e.g.,
RAV ELCHANAN WASSERMAN, KOBBETZ SHIURIM, pt.2 §§ c-d. For a full list of the
many sources dealing with this subject, see OZAR MEFARSHEI HATALMUD, supra note
294.
301 See, e.g., RAy AVIGDOR AMIEL, HAMIDOT LEHEKER HAHALAKHAH (THE EXTENT
OF UNDERSTANDING THE HALAKHAH) 121 (1939).
302 See Yifrach, supra note 194, at 377-78. In comments below, this article uses
Rav Yifrach's definitions regarding the approach of the Aharonim.
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Fisher,30 3 who regards the plaintiff as "he who takes from his
friend" (mozi me-havero) and as the party bearing the burden of
proof.30 4 The power of the migo rule lies in the fact that the
defendant could have chosen to offer an alternative claim and a
new interpretation of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff.305
This interpretation would have totally neutralized the probative
power of the plaintiffs claims, by presenting an equally legitimate
alternative explanation for the facts noted above.30 This approach
was ably explained by Rabbi Yehuda Yifrach,3 °7 according to
whom mgo 's power lies in the fact that the very option of
providing a new explanation to the facts tells us something about
the facts. Equivocal facts that can substantiate the plaintiffs
claims, but which can also be explained from an entirely different
perspective, are not facts which will suffice for extracting
308money. 8 This possibility forces one to recognize that the
plaintiff s version of events is a narrative and not just one of the
possibilities of explaining the dispute, and as such, is insufficient
for taking money.3°9 In other words, according to Rav Fisher, the
claim's power lies in the fact that it presents an alternative
explanation to the plaintiffs evidence and thus undermines the
power of his evidence.
310
Another way of understanding the power of the claim
according to this approach appears in the writings of Rabbi
Shimon Shkopp.311  His contention is that the migo doctrine
strengthens "the possessory presumption of the claimant because
he could have won the dispute in another way, and his possessory
presumption is therefore stronger.' '312 According to this approach,
the presumption that dictates the imposition of the burden of proof
is based partially, and not solely, on physical possession of the
asset.313 It is also based on control of the asset-the ability to
303 See RABBI SHLOMO FISHER, BETH YISHAI (TEACHINGS OF YISHAI), pt.2 § 389.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 See Yifrach, supra note 194, at 349-50.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 See SHKoPP, supra note 299.
312 Id.
313 Id.
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change its legal status.314 A person capable of receiving the asset
effectively has control thereof, and hence any person attempting to
challenge his possession (in its broadened, legal sense) is the
"party taking" and must bring proof.315 A person's possessory
right in money is attended by a number of other rights, including
all of the potential claims that inure to the party with a possessory
right.316 In view of this bundle of potential claims, and not just the
actual claim that was made by the litigant himself, the court can
determine the property rights of the parties. 317  This point was
already made by A. Karlin,318 who argued that the migo claim
should be understood in light of the legal principle governing
monetary matters in Jewish law, whereby the thrust of the
obligation vests in an action and that the law is not created within
the parameters of the pleadings but rather by the material facts as
they relate to the plaintiff and the defendant. 319 This is also the
root of the rule that in certain situations and under certain
conditions the court will, on its own initiative, raise all the claims
that are available to a particular party but which were not raised
for reasons unconnected to the fault of that party. 32 In such cases,
it is not the concrete claim itself that is decisive but rather the legal
picture that materializes out of the action and the claim.321 If the
picture emerging before the court weighs in favor of one party
insofar as the essence of the evidence, and its analysis tends to
substantiate his basic claim, even if he did not make all the
possible claims, then the accumulation of these claims will induce
the court to exercise its discretion in his favor.322 This then, on
one leg, is the basis of the migo rule in Jewish law according to the
314 Id.
315 See Rabbi Yisrael Yaakov Kanievsky, Bava Mezia, KEHILLOT YAAKOV
(ASSEMBLY OF JACOB), § 3. According to Kanievsky, a person whose claim is supported
by migo enjoys a certain degree of control over the asset, similar to the control exercised
by the possessor of an asset. The possibility of winning the asset, being dependent on the
testimony of the litigant, constitutes a kind of abstract presumptive right. By force of this
presumptive right, the claimer of migo attains a legal advantage that compels his rival
litigant to present unequivocal evidence in order to refute the presumption.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 KARLIN, supra note 283, at 59.
319 Id.
320 See Jewish Law, supra note 1, ch. 6.
321 KARLN, supra note 283, at 59.
322 Id.
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"potential of the claim" approach.323
The two aforementioned models (the "credibility of the claim"
and the "potential of the claim") are not necessarily contradictory
or mutually exclusive. 324  Rather, they express different
perspectives. On the one hand, there is a degree of reliance or
credibility attributed by the court to the person making the claims
and on the other hand, the aggregate number of claims available to
the defendant. However, it seems that from the perspective of
modem law,325 the "potential of the claim" doctrine has the upper
hand for two reasons.
The first reason relates to the legal rationale underlying
each of the aforementioned models. The initial presumption of the
credibility doctrine is, as stated, that when a litigant chooses to
make a weak claim (such as "I paid") whereas he could have made
a stronger claim ("the whole thing never happened"), it indicates
326that he is telling the truth. The reason is that had he been a liar,
he would have denied all the facts, and the migo doctrine states
that we should therefore believe him because had he been a liar he
could have made a better claim, which would have enabled him to
327
win the case. It seems, however, that notwithstanding its
attraction and its congruity with human psychology, the credibility
doctrine's basic assumptions are questionable. It relies on the
highly questionable assumption that litigants are experts in
calculating the significance and weight of their claims, and that
they take these factors into account when making a particular
claim. Furthermore, does the mere fact that a litigant made a
certain claim instead of making another, better claim, necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the claim he made is true? Conceivably,
the claim he is making is false, and he was driven by various
motives to make that claim.
328
323 Id.
324 In fact, the leading Yeshiva Heads referred to above, supra note 300300, made
simultaneous use of the two models, seeing them as being complementary models.
325 Modem law seeks a rational and useful legal model, as distinct from the
perspective of the scholar of Jewish law, or the historian, who seeks a faithful description
of the historical perspective of Jewish scholars over the generations.
326 See GULACK, supra note 253, at 10 1-08.
327 Id.
328 However, there is no fear that the litigant will purposely choose a weak claim in
order to benefit from the migo claim because at all events he will find himself in the
same legal situation as he would have been had he made the stronger claim, and as such
he does not profit specifically by reliance on the migo claim. This point should be noted
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In fact, arguably, the logic of this approach leads to precisely
the opposite conclusion. That is to say, a person pleading "I paid"
should not be believed, because the claim may be false. The
defendant has not in fact paid the debt, but he is afraid to
absolutely deny the existence of a debt, preferring a partial denial
by admitting to the existence of a debt, and claiming its payment,
all of which places him in the category of confession and
avoidance.
Notably, in Jewish law there is also a situation governed by the
basic presumptions of confession and avoidance and the
affirmative defense doctrine. 329  Where a defendant partially
admits to the plaintiffs claim, he is required to take a biblical oath
with respect to the section denied. 330 The Talmud offers the
following explanation for this rule:
For Rabbah said: The reason the Torah has declared
that he who admits part of his opponent's claim
must take an oath is the presumption that nobody
would take up such an impertinent attitude towards
his creditor [as to give a complete denial to his
claim]. The defendant [in this case] would have
liked to give a complete denial, but he has not done
so because he has not been able to take up such an
impertinent attitude. On the other hand, it may be
assumed that the defendant would have been ready
to admit the whole claim, and that he has not done
so because of a desire to put the claimant off for a
time, thinking: 'When I shall have money, I shall
pay him.' Therefore the Divine Law imposes an
oath upon him, so that he may admit the whole
claim. 3
3I
A partial admission of the claim provides grounds for the
Talmud's assumption that the claim in its entirety was justified
carefully.
329 See TALMUD, BAVA MEZIA 3a-b.
330 Such as when Yaakov sues Yitzhak for a debt of $100, and Yitzhak admits to a
debt of fifty but denies more than he admits to (in other words, he admits to part of the
claim). In this case, Yitzhak would take an oath that he does not owe another fifty dollars
to Yaakov, and he would pay what he admits to and be exempt from paying the balance.
If he failed to take an oath, then he would also be required to pay the part that he did not
admit to.
331 See TALMUD, BAVA MEZIA 3a-b; TALMUD, SHEBUOTH 42b.
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and that the defendant offered a partial denial only as a means of
delaying payment until such time as he was able to pay the entire
debt.3 32 Consequently, the litigant who admits to part of the claim
is required to take a biblical oath with respect to that part of the
debt which is contested.333 This assumption, which is similarly
based on human nature, is diametrically opposed to the point of
departure underlying the migo doctrine according to the credibility
model. Then, why isn't the partial admitter exempted from the
obligation of taking an oath, and believed based on the migo
doctrine to the effect that if he was a liar he would have denied the
debt in its entirety? This question poses a real challenge to many
of the commentators, who offer a variety of answers, and resort to
complex legal presumptions taken from the areas of civil law and
the laws of oaths.334 In any event, none of the answers provided
by commentators nullify the fact that there are essentially two
theories antithetically opposed to each other.
One may therefore conclude that there are grounds for
doubting the basic rationale and basic psychological assumptions
underlying the credibility doctrine. The legal rationale for the
"potentiality of the claim" doctrine, on the other hand, stands on
far firmer ground because it does not rely on questionable
psychological assumptions that support putting trust in particular
claims. Rather, it is based on a clarification of the potential legal
pleadings.
The second reason for the modem lawyer to prefer the
potentiality doctrine over the credibility doctrine relates to the
character of the adjudicative proceeding and the manner in which
judgment is reached according to each of the models. 335 If the
court ascribes importance to the manner in which a pleading is
made, as per the credibility doctrine, the suspicion is that the entire
litigation will take on a subjective, artificial character, because the
form and procedure for presenting the pleadings to the court bear
no connection at all to the litigant's real legal position but rather to
332 See TALMUD, BAVA MEZIA 3a-b.
333 Id.
334 See TALMUD, TOSAFOT IN BAVA MEZIA 3a ("mipnei ma amra hatorah"
discussing at length why migo in this case would be of no effect); see also OZAR
MEFARSHEI HATALMUD, BAVA MEZIA (COLLECTION OF COMMENTARY ON THE TALMUD)
at 114-15 (for a survey of the varying responses on this matter); ALBECK, supra note
205, at 183-91 (discussing the subject at length).
335 See Ben-Pazzi, supra note 256, at 98-99.
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his character.336 Conceivably, a particular litigant may be capable
of lying outright with equanimity, and without batting an eye. On
the other hand, another litigant may begin stammering and become
confused when presenting his claims, despite their veracity. This
ambiguity is also the case regarding the manner in which the judge
concludes that a particular litigant is telling the truth. Professor
Gulack notes the difficulty in positing fixed criterion for the
evaluation of matters on which there is no substantive proof, and
in which the court attempts to read the minds of the parties and
assess their claims, their plots and devious schemes by means of
logical theories. 337 Gulack questions whether it is even possible to
use logic as a tool for deciding the degree of trust to place in
litigants' claims when they are so different from one another in
terms of their virtues and the manner in which they plan their
affairs.338
On the other hand, if we wish to have judgments that are based
on objective considerations,339 then there is no place for undue
emphasis on the manner in which claims are made in the court as
is the case under the credibility doctrine. The potentiality
doctrine, however, appropriately answers these issues. The court
does not determine the weight of the claim as a function of what
was actually claimed. 340 Rather, the probative degree of a certain
claim is based on a priori considerations: the total number of
claims that the litigant had the ability to raise determines the
court's assessment of a particular claim raised before it.
34 1
Finally, it is noteworthy that the doctrine of the claim's
potential, being mainly concerned with the total number of
potential claims attaching to the possessory right of the litigant on
the asset and which attest to it, is congruent with the evidentiary
rule of "he who takes from his friend bears the burden of
336 Id.
337 GULAK, supra note 253, at 101.
338 However, Gulack's answer is, "Our legal doctrine does not leave the evaluation
of litigants' pleadings to judicial discretion only, but rather provides the judge with fixed
criterion for his evaluation of the claims, and in accordance therewith to determine the
degree of belief which each of them merits." See Gulack supra note 253, at 101 (at the
same time, the implementation of these rules is largely dependent on the subjective
evaluation of the Judge regarding the nature of the litigant's pleadings).
339 Presumably, this is one of the central objectives guiding the modem lawyer.
340 See GULAK, supra note 253, at 101
341 Id.
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proof."342 The latter gives priority to the person in possession of
the money 343 and even substantiates his claim. We emphasize
once more that not only is preference given to the party in
possession of the money substantiated by the migo doctrine; but it
is also justified from a moral perspective because it provides
security and certainty and is consistent with the constitutional
protection of property rights.
3. The Migo as an Incentive for Truthful Claims
This section addresses a particularly important procedural
aspect of the migo doctrine, one that has been neglected and rarely
discussed in the rich literature dealing with migo. As noted, one of
the most severe problems with the affirmative defense doctrine is
that it encourages the defendant to make false claims to avoid
being saddled with the burden of proof.344 This problem does not
exist with respect to the migo doctrine. Maimonides's rulings
regarding adjudication procedure and pleadings are particularly
illuminating on this point.345 At the beginning of Chapter six of
his Laws of Pleading, Maimonides outlines the procedure
governing the parties' pleadings:
If litigants came to court and one of them said, "I
have with this man a mina which I lent to him," or
"deposited with him," or "which he took from me
unlawfully," or "which he owes me in wages," and
the like, and the defendant answered, "I do not owe
you anything," or "You do not have anything in my
hands," or "You are making a false claim," it is not
a proper answer.
342 See discussion supra Part III.A.
343 See Ben-Pazzi, supra note 256, at 99. Ben-Pazzi also clarifies that "this
approach does not claim that the aggregate of all potential claims establishes the
probative value of the claim that was actually made, but rather they create the
presumption in his favor. It would be correct to argue that by virtue of his ability to
dismiss his rival, the strength and intensity of the legal presumption (of ownership)
exceeds that of his rival, and his rival hence bears the burden of adducing evidence. The
fact of his benefiting from this presumption means that irrespective of his claim,
however weak, he will always trump his opponent until the latter produces clear
evidence that contradicts his claim." Id. at 97, n. 1.
344 See discussion supra Part II.C. 1.
345 Moses Maimonides, The Code of Maimonides, Book Thirteen, THE BOOK OF
CIVIL LAWS 212-13 (Jacob J. Rabinowitz trans, Yale University Press 1949).
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The court will say to the defendant: "Make answer
to his claim and be as specific in your answer as he
was in his claim; say whether you borrowed money
from him or you did not borrow money, whether he
deposited anything with you or he did not deposit,
whether you took anything from him unlawfully or
you did not take, whether you hired him or you did
not hire," and so with respect to other claims.346
Maimonides's comments indicate that the court must instruct
the parties to clarify and detail their claims, as well as present
them precisely. He then presents the reason for this requirement:
And why is such an answer not acceptable? For
fear that the defendant errs in his opinion and that
he may thus unwittingly come to swear to a
falsehood, since it is possible that the plaintiff lent
the money to the defendant, as he claims, and that
the defendant returned the debt to the plaintiff s son
or wife .. .and that he thinks that he has thereby
been discharged of the debt.
The defendant is therefore told, 'How can you say
you are not liable in anything, when it is possible
that you are liable at law to pay without your
knowing it; inform the judges of the specific
meaning of your words and they will advise you
whether or not you are liable.'
347
Maimonides stresses that the litigant must present his factual
claim (and its precise significance)348and is forbidden to raise legal
claims which require familiarity with the intricacies of civil laws,
since it is unclear whether he possesses such knowledge. 349 Nor is
he entitled to make a claim (such as "I do not owe him"); such
claims require expertise in legal matters, and it is doubtful whether
he possesses that expertise, "for fear that the defendant errs in his
346 Id.
347 Id. at 213.
348 Possibly, according to Maimonides, if the litigant does not elaborate on his
claim, he will lose the case. See, e.g., SHULCHAN ARUCH, HOSHEN MISHPAT 75; RABBI
YAIR CHAIM BACH, CHAVOT YA'IR (COMMENTARIES ON THE SHULCHAN ARUCH) (noting
that in this respect Maimonides differs from Asheri, who is cited in the Arba'ah Turim).
349 Maimonides, supra note 345, at 213.
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opinion., 350 Legal claims are only made at the second stage when
the court establishes the legal significance of the parties pleadings,
"Inform the judges of the specific meaning of your words and they
will advise you whether or not you are liable." 51
Maimonides statements apparently complement his statements
at the end of Chapter 21 of Hilkhot Sanhedrin.352 According to
Maimonides, it is precisely the litigants' lack of legal knowledge
that enables the disclosure of the factual truth.353 Parties who are
aware of the legal significance of their acts will be wary of telling
the simple, unadulterated truth to the court and will endeavor to
create as many obstacles as possible for their opponents. 354 They
will not admit to a fact if their opponent possesses no admissible
and conclusive proof.355 According to Maimonides, it is precisely
the layman litigant, ignorant of the ins and outs of halakha, who is
liable to disclose the truth in order to concede or settle the justified
356
claim of his rival. The Jewish system of law is based on the
assumption that the direct confrontation between the parties,
unmediated by attorneys, is liable to lead to the disclosure of the
truth; the judge's role is limited to the role of guiding the
confrontation without assisting the parties in their factual
pleadings. 357 One of the central features of the Jewish procedural
system is its suitability for laymen who are not conversant with the
intricacies of the law.358 In fact, court procedures during the
hearing stage are particularly simple, characterized by one-on-one
confrontation between litigants and judges, without the desires of
the litigants being sieved through the channels of complicated
formalism.
359
In the Laws of Pleading, Maimonides exposes a weakness in
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Yuval Sinai, Al Ta'as Azmecha KeOrchei HaDayaanim (Do Not Play the Part of
An Advocate), in ANAIM B'MISHPAT AVRI V'B'HALACHA: DAYN v'DIYUN (STUDIES IN
JEWISH LAW: JUDGE AND JUDGMENT) 93-128 (Yakov Chava & Amitai Radzyner eds.,
Bar-Ilan University Presse, 2006) [hereinafter Sinai].
353 Id. at 123-27.
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 Id.
357 Id.
358 Sinai, supra note 352, at 123-27.
359 Id.
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his theoretical procedural model.360  The system of a direct
confrontation between the litigants may disclose the factual truth
when both parties lack legal knowledge, but what happens when
one of the parties is particularly clever and also versed in the law?
The clever person will hesitate before clarifying his statements,
being aware of the implications of a true statement of fact when its
legal clout is weak.3  Maimonides addresses this point, stating
that:
Even if the defendant is a great scholar, he is told,
"You will incur no disadvantage by answering the
plaintiff's claim and by informing us as to why you
are not liable-whether because no such thing ever
occurred or because you paid what you owed-
since we always apply the inference of
credibility.362
What does Maimonides add in the last sentence? Apparently
he is explaining that one can ensure the disclosure of the factual
truth even when dealing with a clever person who hesitates in
making a true factual claim due to its legal weakness.
363
Maimonides explains that the migo rule enables the clever person
to give a true statement despite its weakness in the legal sense.
A litigant will always retain the legal right to make a more
powerful claim in terms of legal import because the court always
adjudicates having consideration for what he could have said.
Incidentally, this reality highlights another interesting aspect of the
migo claim. Generally, the migo is understood as a logical-
evidential doctrine that buttresses the claims of the party making
the claim. 366  However, Maimonides' ad loc also alludes to its
importance on the procedural level because the migo rule enables
the party to give his true statement.
367
360 Maimonides, supra note 345, at 213.
361 Id.
362 Id.
363 Id.
364 Id.
365 See, e.g., AMIEL, supra note 301, at 121 (noting the fact that these comments are
consistent with Maimonides wording may indicate his tendency towards the potentiality
doctrine as the basis of the migo rule).
366 See GULACK, supra note 253, at 118; Cohen, supra note 256; Rivlin, supra note
256; ALBECK, supra note 205, at 172-80; Ben-Pazzi, supra note 256; Yifrach, supra note
196.
367 See Maimonides, supra note 345, at 213.
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A similar rationalization is made in a contemporary legal study
by Allen et al. supporting contingent claims as rationalizing the
attorney-client privilege.36 8  According to the authors' views,
people must be encouraged to make such claims because they give
potential clients "an incentive to substitute away from dishonest
denials." 369 The attorney-client privilege is especially designed to
encourage clients to divulge unfavorable information on which
legal claims frequently depend. 370  In sum, the attorney-client
privilege "facilitates inquiry into legal claims beyond the ken of
lay persons. By doing so, the values that underlie contingent
claims are furthered, and contingent claims, no less than others,
produce real benefits., 371 Among these benefits is "the decrease
in fraud in the system, which occurs each time an individual who
otherwise would have committed fraud in litigation is channeled to
litigate a truthful contingent claim., 372  Under this theory, the
ultimate justification for the privilege lies in the improvements in
behavior that result from the increased availability of contingent
claims.373 The same theory, regarding a different doctrine and a
different legal system, was given to the migo doctrine by
Maimonides.
374
Indeed, there is a certain similarity between the migo doctrine
in the Jewish procedural system and the possibility of raising
alternative claims in the Anglo-American procedural systems, but
there is a central difference between the two systems. 375 Migo
posits a positive-educational imperative: tell the truth even if your
claim is weak; abide by it as though it were a superb claim. 376 The
message in the common law system is different: do whatever you
want, honestly or dishonestly, provided that the burden of proof is
imposed on your opponent.
On the other hand, the problem of the litigant's fear of the
consequences of telling the truth is not totally solved by the migo
368 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 32, at 362-69.
369 Id. at 366.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 See Maimonides, supra note 345.
375 See Rivlin, supra note 256, at 127.
376 Id.
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doctrine because the fear still exists in those cases in which the
migo plea does not apply for various reasons (such as failure to
satisfy one of the many threshold conditions required for the migo
claim). This, however, does not detract from the basic contention
that the migo doctrine, far more than the doctrine of confession
and avoidance, encourages litigants to make truthful statements.
At the same time, it is clear that the migo doctrine alone is
insufficient to ensure truthful factual pleadings on the part of
litigants; rather, it is just one component of a broader procedural
environment (presented in the next chapter) that is conducive to
the realization of that objective.
C. Procedural Atmosphere: Legal Tools that Induce the
Litigants to Raise Truthful Claims
1. General
The late Israeli Supreme Court Justice Haim Herman Cohn
stated: "The system of Jewish law is without parallel among all the
other systems of law in its disclosure of truth as an element of
justice, and its subordination thereto." 377 Jewish law is a religious
law, and, as such, the central objective guiding the judge is truth-
based litigation, an objective which is even imposed on him as a
religious obligation.3 78  This obligation has implications in a
number of dimensions.379 The disclosure of the truth is perhaps
the most central value to have shaped Jewish law's approach to the
nature of litigation.380  Against this background, this article
presents the procedural atmosphere in the Jewish law with respect
to the pleadings of the litigants, as structured to induce truthful
pleadings. In that context, there are a number of the legal tools
conducive to the attainment of that comprehensive goal. For
example, according to litigation procedure in Jewish law, there are
no exceptions to the duty of raising truthful claims and the
prohibition on lying is total; even if the litigant did not intend
thereby to distort the truth and, even if it means incurring a loss he
377 See H.CoHN, HAMISHPAT (THE COURT) 119 (1992).
378 See Jewish Law, supra note 1, at 352-53.
379 See id. (discussing the repercussions of that obligation on the formulation of the
modes for the court's intervention in the judicial proceeding in view of the sources of
Jewish law).
380 Id.
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is not permitted to lie.381 In this context, it is not only forbidden to
lie, but it is also forbidden to create an impression intended to
mislead the other party.382
In the Jewish system of procedural law, the duty to raise
truthful claims is not only a moral one, but also a legal one with
far-reaching repercussions. If a litigant makes a claim that
subsequently proves to be false, he is then presumed to be a liar
and is not believed regarding any further claims that he may have
in that particular trial.383 The following example illustrates the
broad implications of being caught in a lie and presumed thereafter
to be a liar.384 David sued Solomon for the repayment of a loan.
According to David, the debt originated from an oral loan and
therefore he does not require a bill attesting to the note. Solomon
claims that the oral loan never happened. Should Solomon's claim
be refuted by witnesses' testimony after he retracts his denial and
claims that "I paid," Solomon will be regarded as having
impeached himself, presumed to be a liar, and will be obligated to
pay. Even if the witnesses to the loan subsequently testify that he
paid the debt, it cannot exempt Salomon, because the rule in
Jewish law is that "Whoever says I did not take a loan is regarded
as having claimed I did not pay," and a person is believed with
respect to himself more than one hundred witnesses. 385  This
example indicates the extent of loss incurred by the lying litigant.
Had Salomon claimed, "It is true that I borrowed, but I paid," he
would not have been obligated to pay because the other party
(David) would have carried the burden of proof, and in the
absence of a note is unable to force Solomon to pay. However,
insofar as Salomon raised a false claim he worsened his position.
This example demonstrates that the procedural rules of the Jewish
law create a real deterrence against raising false claims.
The presumption that the litigant is a liar does not mean that he
is forever stigmatized as a liar who cannot be trusted in any
litigation; the presumption only applies to the litigation in which
he was found to have lied.386 The underlying rationale is quite
381 See Ben-Aderet, supra note 241, at n.81.
382 See id.
383 See SHULCHAN ARUCH, HOSHEN MISHPAT 79:5.
384 See SHULCHAN ARUCH, HOSHEN MISHPAT 79:1,5.
385 Id.
386 See SHULCHAN ARUCH, HOSHEN MISHPAT 79:5.
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simple. At the moment that one of the litigants is found to have
lied with respect to one of the main points being decided upon, it
becomes clear that his version is either totally or partially untrue,
which leads the court to believe the other litigant.
A result of the duty to make truthful claims and the prohibition
against false claims is that Jewish jurisprudence does not
recognize the institution of alternative factual claims, which is the
practice in the common law adversary system. The Jewish
Rabbinical Court will therefore refuse to accept a claim of "I did
not borrow" and alternatively, "I borrowed but have repaid."
Under the adversary system, if the defendant makes this claim and
witnesses testify that he indeed borrowed, he does not thereby
forfeit his right to make the alternative claim, even after the
refutation of his first claim, and he is now entitled to raise and
prove his alternative claim of having paid the debt.387  This
situation is not possible in the Jewish procedural system, for
having been proved to have lied in his first claim, the defendant is
presumed to be a liar and will not be believed regarding his second
claim; the plaintiff will be believed and will hence win the trial.
388
On this point, one of the foremost Halakhic authorities (Rishonim)
claimed that even if the defendant's original claim was not refuted
by witnesses he would nonetheless forfeit his reliability in relation
to that claim by making the alternative claim.
389
Finally, it bears mentioning that Jewish procedural law
contains additional rules that aim to ensure the truthfulness of
litigants' claims.390 Jewish procedural law institutionalizes direct
contact between the court and the litigants and between the
litigants themselves, including the prohibition of written
pleadings,391 the limitation of attorney assistance, the litigants'
duty of being personally present when hearing their claims,392 and
387 See, e.g., Jacob, supra note 124, at 88-89.
388 See id.
389 See Ben-Aderet, supra note 241, at n.91:4.
390 Id.
391 See Resp. Ribash, n. 298. The rationale for this is that hearing the oral pleadings
of the parties themselves may indicate which of them speaks the truth whereas
experience with claim sheets demonstrates that the judge is unable to learn anything
because they are usually worded by another person (usually an advocate), who words
them according to legal considerations, even if they do not reflect the truth.
392 See SHuLcHAN ARUCH, HOSHEN MISHPAT 14:5. The reason for this halakhah is
that when the opposing party is not present, the litigant making his claims can present
untrue claims in the guise of truth without being confronted by a party who is aware of
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limitations on hearing of pleadings by way of an interpreter. 393
2. Cost-Efficiency and Costly Signaling394
The argument for the cost-effectiveness of the Jewish law
model is strengthened using a game-theoretic approach.
Credibility rules, as Stein noted, often "involve a . . . game-
theoretic technique: costly signaling. By making his or her
signaling costly, to himself or herself, a person may separate it
from cheap talk and make the prospect that fact-finders will find
his or her signaling credible [and] more probable." 395 To avoid the
inefficiency of cheap talking, according to this approach, evidence
law needs to encourage witnesses and litigants to use credible
signaling. 396 The Jewish law facilitates costly credible signaling.
The general tendency of the migo doctrine, as presented in the end
of Part III, is to allay the litigants' fears regarding the
repercussions of testifying truthfully. This tendency is
supplemented by the general procedural environment that was
presented above, and especially the basic rule that if a litigant is
found to have lied, he is presumed to be a liar and will no longer
be believed in any of his claims in that trial. The personal risk the
litigant assumes qualifies as a costly signaling that bolsters the
credibility of his statements.
397
The conclusion is that the tendency evidenced by the migo
the lie and can deny it. A direct battle between the rival parties lessens the chances of
one party brazenly lying and the truth seeking judge will be able to discern the fabricated
claims of a party not telling the truth and will not be impressed by them. At all events
there are more chances of his discovering false claims when the parties are confronting
and arguing with each other.
393 See SHULCHAN ARUCH, HOSHEN MISHPAT 14:6. The reason for this halakhah is
that the interpreter creates a division between the court and the litigant in a manner that
prevents the court from drawing its own direct conclusions from the litigant's form of
pleading. A priori, the hearing should be conducted in the presence of judge who know
the language of the litigants, but if this was not possible one may rely on the custom that
post facto validates the acceptance of litigant's claims by way of an interpreter. See
Netivot Mishpat, on Sh.Ar, novellaia, 11.
394 Costly signaling occurs when a litigant conveys information to another party
through an action that wastes resources, thus both demonstrating and encouraging
sincerity. For example, a criminal defendant may promise to allow the prosecution to use
his confession as evidence if he breaches his plea bargain. As a result, the prosecutor
may offer an even better plea bargain since she believes that the defendant is credible.
See FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE, supra note 87, at 165-67.
395 FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE, supra note 87, at 165.
396 Id. at 167.
397 See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Expert Witness 13 J.
ECON. PERSP. 91 (1999) [hereinafter Expert Witness] (for a similar example regarding the
expert witness).
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doctrine fits smoothly into a general normative procedural
environment, which aims to ensure the veracity of the litigants'
claims by use of legal tools. The procedural environment in
Jewish law is decidedly different from the procedural environment
in adversary proceedings, which are not overly perturbed by false
pleadings of litigants. Arguably, the differences between the migo
doctrine and the affirmative defense doctrine derive from more
profound, general differences between the world view underlying
the adversary system and that of Jewish law.
IV. Concluding Comparative Analysis
Part II of this article is devoted to a critical analysis of the
doctrine of affirmative defense and the rules governing the burden
of persuasion in common law. This article addresses some of the
doctrine's central difficulties and deficiencies, chief among them
being the lack of a satisfactory justification for the burden of
persuasion rules in common law. 398 Naturally, these difficulties
also characterize the doctrine of affirmative defense that places the
burden of persuasion on the defendant without sufficient
justification.
The central problem with the affirmative defense doctrine is its
influence on the conduct of litigation proceedings between the
parties. 399 The doctrine of affirmative defense provides a negative
incentive to the honest person interested in giving a full and
complete story and dissuades him from doing so due to his fear of
being "punished" by having the burden of persuasion transferred
to him. The result is that the doctrine of affirmative defense,
especially in situations of confession and avoidance, actually
incites the litigant to mendacity in the knowledge that even if he is
found to be a sinne,r his acts will also profit him. It also
encourages the parties to abuse their right of access to legal
authorities, thereby impairing the rights of access of the other side.
From the economic cost-efficiency perspective, this situation
places an onerous burden on the court in its efforts to uncover the
truth, as well as significantly increases the costs of the
proceeding. 400 These costs would be saved if the governing
398 See supra Part ILA, IIB.
399 See supra Part II.C.I.
400 See supra Part II.D.
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procedural-evidential doctrine encouraged the parties to enter
truthful pleadings (like the Jewish law model). The doctrine of
affirmative defense also spawns uncertainty in the question of who
bears the burden of persuasion in both criminal and civil cases.40 1
Constitutional considerations (protection of property rights in civil
cases) may also militate against imposing the burden of persuasion
on the defendant in situations of affirmative defense.40 2
Part III of the article presented a procedural model based on
the principles of Jewish law. It analyzed the legal bases of the
fundamental rule "he who takes from his friend bears the burden
of proof' and of the migo doctrine, indicating the advantage of
these two rules in comparison with the affirmative defense
doctrine and the burden of persuasion rules as practiced in the
common law. In Part III.A, the article argues that there is no
principle more justified than the principle that "he who takes from
his friend bears the burden of proof," which does not only pertain
to the physical presence of assets in the possession of the
defendant but is also motivated by the interest in preserving legal
security and stability. This consideration dictates the preservation
of the status quo, and consequently, the litigant attempting to
change the status quo bears the burden of persuading the court that
it is appropriate to do so. The principle that "he who takes from
his friend bears the burden of proof' is justified by considerations
of morality, legal stability, and security. From the perspective of
economic efficiency, it is the most appropriate rule for
determining the burden of persuasion in civil cases, and it is also
consistent with the constitutional protection of property rights.
Quite often legal policy considerations dictate the imposition of
the burden of persuasion on a particular party (i.e., the defendant),
even if from a strictly legal perspective that party cannot be
regarded as a person "taking" from his friend. This article
presents three examples for deviation from the basic rule that "he
who takes from his friend bears the burden of proof." The basic
principle of the first example is similar to one of the principles of
the evidentiary damage doctrine which can shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant whenever the latter is responsible for
inflicting evidentiary damage on the plaintiff. A second example
401 See supra Part I.C.3.
402 See supra Part II.C.3.
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of deviation from the rule that "he who takes from his friend bears
the burden of proof" concerns cases where the evidence
supporting the plaintiffs claims is in the hands of the party in
possession (i.e., the defendant), and the plaintiff proves that only
the defendant in possession is capable of bringing the evidence in
support of the plaintiffs claims. In such a case the rabbinical
court may impose the burden of proof on the defendant. The third
example pertains to a particularly controversial issue in modem
law: who carries the burden, of proof in appeals on tax
assessments? The Jewish law approach indicates that whenever an
individual has a dispute with his community concerning tax
matters the community first collects the tax, and even when the
taxpayer has retained possession of the sum in dispute, the burden
of proof rests with the taxpayer and not the community.
Part 1II.B focused on the migo doctrine, which strengthens a
claim made by a litigant in cases where he could have made a
better claim which would have been believed. Insofar as he could
have raised a more powerful claim, but chose not to raise it, he is
also believed regarding the claim that he actually made. The migo
doctrine is categorically different from the affirmative defense
doctrine (and the confession and avoidance principle); both lead to
diametrically opposed results. Halakhic authorities accept the
broad rule that migo cannot itself form the grounds for a claim
because in order to succeed, the plaintiff must submit substantial
evidence, and migo does not fall into that category. According to
another basic rule, migo is not effective against substantial
evidence. Not only is the migo rule consistent with the rule "he
who takes from his friend bears the burden of truth," but it also
supplements and strengthens that rule, because it strengthens the
defendant's claim in cases in which the plaintiff does not have any
proof.
The migo doctrine is anchored in two legal models. According
to the first model- the doctrine of the "credibility of the claim" -
the defendant is believed even without producing evidence
because had he wished to lie, he could have chosen a stronger
claim: "such a thing never occurred." This claim constitutes a
blanket denial, and it would have compelled the plaintiff to prove
his claim in its entirety. The rule applying to a litigant who is
apparently not lying is no less beneficial to him than the rule
applying to a litigant who may very well be lying. Under the
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credibility model, migo helps establish a degree of credibility to
the actual claim made by the litigant.
The second model is the "potentiality of the claim" doctrine,
according to which the total number of claims that a litigant can
potentially claim attests to the degree of power and possessory
right exercised by the litigant in respect of the asset in dispute.
The later Halakhic authorities adopt a number of approaches in
explaining the probative value of the migo according to the
potential of the claim doctrine. Rabbi Shimon Shkopp contends
that a person's ability to dispose of his rival litigant by force of a
particular claim proves that his possessory right in the asset is
stronger than that of his rival, and as such, the rival bears the
burden of proof. A person's possessory right over an asset
bestows him with a number of other rights, inter alia all of the
potential claims that a person holding a possessory right can make
in his favor with respect to the asset in his possession. Rabbi
Shlomo Fisher took the view that the migo claim undermines the
plaintiffs claim, because the mere possibility of offering an
alternative explanation of the plaintiffs claims and evidence
attests to the nature of his claims and evidence. The migo claim
thus demotes the plaintiffs claims to that of a narrative only. In
other words, the migo claim is a possible, non-exclusive way of
explaining a particular set of facts.
The two aforementioned models do not necessarily contradict
each other; rather, they reflect two different perspectives.
However, the modem lawyer would most likely still prefer the
potentiality doctrine over the credibility doctrine. The advantage
of the potentiality claim lies in the fact that this doctrine is
primarily concerned with the total number of potential claims that
accompany the litigant's possessory right of the asset, and which
attest to it, thereby fortifying and supplementing the central
evidential rule that "he who takes from his friend bears the burden
of proof," and is generally consistent with the doctrine of
possessory rights.
Another procedural advantage of the migo doctrine pertains to
one of the gravest pitfalls of the affirmative defense doctrine,
namely the encouragement it offers to defendants to avoid truthful
testimony for fear of being saddled with the burden of proof. This
problem is non-existent in the migo doctrine, and even if the
problem exists, then it is not of the same gravity. The migo rule
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enables the litigant to present his true claim, despite his awareness
of the legal weight and significance of the claim, and even if the
claim is legally weak. The reason is that he will always benefit
from the legal right conferred by the stronger claim in terms of its
legal significance. The migo doctrine frees the litigant from fear
of the consequences of telling the truth (the like of which we
observed in the affirmative defense doctrine). It blends seamlessly
into a broader normative framework which uses legal tools to
facilitate truthful pleadings by litigants.
40 3
This article bolstered the argument of the Jewish law model's
cost-efficiency by using a game-theoretic: costly signaling. This
approach demonstrates how Jewish law uses legal tools to ensure
the veracity of the litigants' claims and facilitates costly credible
signaling. The general tendency in the migo doctrine is to allay
the litigants' fears regarding the repercussions of making a truthful
claim. This tendency coheres with, and indeed is supplemented
and fortified by the general procedural environment previously
discussed. Of particular importance is the basic rule that if a
litigant is found to have lied, he is presumed to be a liar and will
no longer be believed in any of his claims in that trial. This
personal risk that the litigant assumes qualifies as a costly
signaling that bolsters the credibility of his statements. The migo
doctrine also attains the goal of efficient fact-finding by
neutralizing the two obstacles which are relevant in the affirmative
defense, as mentioned above. The first obstacle is the divergence
between the private and the social benefits that adjudication
engenders. The second obstacle is the unobservable private
information that parties and witnesses hold, which remains
throughout the trial hidden and private, as opposed to open and
public. Indeed, the migo doctrine and the Jewish procedural
environment tackle these obstacles by encouraging and facilitating
truthful pleadings by litigants, and as a result, these legal tools
reduce the divergence between the private and the social benefits
that adjudication engenders and encourages exposure of private
information.
The procedural atmosphere in Jewish law differs categorically
from the procedural environment in an adversarial system, for as
previously discussed, the latter is not particularly concerned by the
403 See supra Part III.C.
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prospect of false statements in the pleadings. The differences
between the migo doctrine and the affirmative defense doctrine are
a direct result of the more profound and general differences
between the world view underlying the common law procedural
approach and that of Jewish law. There is a central difference
between the two systems. The migo doctrine posits a positive-
educational imperative: tell the truth even if your claim is weak;
abide by it as though it were a superb claim. The message in the
common law system is different: do whatever you want, honestly
or dishonestly, provided that the burden of proof is imposed on
your opponent. However, seeds of change are appearing. In
England itself, the birthplace of the adversarial system, recent
years have seen a number of significant retreats from the
adversarial approach and the transition to a game of "open
cards. 4 °4 A similar retreat from the extreme adversarial system is
also evident in American law.40 5 I believe that the gradual
transition from this system to a more inquisitorial system is
commendable and certainly desirable, because it contributes to the
discovery of the truth. If the tendency towards the "open cards"
game and disclosure of truth gains momentum, one may expect a
renewed examination of the implications of the affirmative
defense doctrine and its ability to cause honest people to be
hesitant in entering factually honest statements because of their
fear of being saddled with the burden of persuasion.
404 A significant turning point in this context occurred in 1999 when the new civil
procedure laws were passed. See LORD HARRY WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL
REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND
WALES (1996). Some of Woolf's reforms concern disclosure obligations and "open
cards" game in pleadings. For a critical discussion of the various aspects of Woolfs
reforms, see LEGAL ACTION GROUP ACHIEVING CIVIL JUSTICE: APPROPRIATE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION FOR THE 1990S (Roger Smith ed., 1996); Stephen Goldstein, The Woolf
Report and its Critics in a Comparative Perspective, University of Oxford, Institute of
Comparative and European Law, Oxford 1-48 (1999).
405 For a description and critique of this tendency, see Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 2-3 (2nd ed. 1993); RICHARD L. MARCUS,
MARTIN H. REDISH & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 2
(2nd ed. 1995); Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the
Adversarial Balance, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1567 (1986); Honorable Bruce E. Bohlman &
Erick J. Bohlman, Wandering in the Wilderness of Dispute Resolution: When Do We
Arrive at the Promised Land of Justice? 70 N.D. L. REv. 235 (1994); Joseph Sanders,
Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of Adversarial Processes,
48 DEPAUL L. REV. 355 (1998).
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